# Analysis and Proposals on dYdX Chain and DYDX Tokenomics **URL:** \ **Category:** Proposals\ **Created:** [October 22, 2024, 11:03am UTC](https://dydx.forum/t/analysis-and-proposals-on-dydx-chain-and-dydx-tokenomics/3093 "2024-10-22T11:03:13Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 13
**Author:** ![RealVovochka](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/dydx.forum/realvovochka/32/2646_2.png) [@RealVovochka](https://dydx.forum/u/RealVovochka)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2024, 6:02am UTC](https://dydx.forum/t/analysis-and-proposals-on-dydx-chain-and-dydx-tokenomics/3093/13 "2024-10-23T06:02:56Z")
In my opinion, **none of these proposals, except for reducing C, will positively impact the token price** ; in fact, they might do the opposite. It’s clear that if we **reduce staking rewards, we decrease the token’s attractiveness**. Moving **40% of revenue to the MegaVault seems very strange**. So far, the Vaults haven’t proven anything and are running at a **loss of around 10% APY** (a very rough estimate, as there’s no detailed report on the Vaults). On one hand, the idea of **paying for liquidity in USDC is appealing** , but on the other hand, **how does the token fit into this?** I think if we want to incentivize liquidity, we need a **hybrid model**. For example, a user could become an LP in the MegaVault if they **lock a certain amount of dydx tokens for a period of time**. The **longer the lock, the higher the percentage** they might earn on their capital and/or have **higher available limits as an LP**. In this format, **directing a portion of the protocol’s revenue makes sense**. --- _[View the full topic](https://dydx.forum/t/analysis-and-proposals-on-dydx-chain-and-dydx-tokenomics/3093)._