In my opinion, Stride and its investors will acquire excessively substantial control over the protocol, at least in the short term, which makes it absolutely essential to have a program from pStake that would balance the governance.
Voting results so far:
| Name | Stake,dydx(M) | Vote |
|---|---|---|
| Imperator | 5.33 | Yes |
| Polkachu | 2.44 | Yes |
| Kingnodes | 0.816 | Yes |
| PRO Delegators | 0.633 | Yes |
| Crosnest | 2.086 | Not Voted |
| Strangelove | 0.367 | Not Voted |
| Cryptocrew x Defi Dojo | 0.772 | Abstain |
| Enigma | 1.83 | Yes |
| ECO Stake | 0.967 | Yes |
| Smart Stake | 0.963 | Yes |
| Lavender.Five nodes | 0.61 | Yes |
| Kiln | 4.97 | Yes |
| Meria | 0.433 | Yes |
| Cosmostation | 2.88 | Yes |
Stride’s Investors: Imperator, Cosmostation, ChorusOne
Stride’s Investors in MEV committee(can recommend validator slashing): Reverie, Michael Neuder
Stride validators are responsible for 66.3% of Yes Votes
Stride investors are responsible for 24.88% of Yes Votes
After potential 20M addition Stride validators and Stride’s investors will control 48% of voting power outside Top2 (Which are VC’s validators)
If currently even Stride investors do not abstain from voting despite conflicts of interest, I see no change in the future. How will the community be able to influence a centralized set of validators or cancel the program?
With the most substantial spending of community treasury we must not create a system so vulnerable, that misses any checks and balances.