Thanks, finally!!!
It is nice for the short term to have a higher staked amount, but it makes staking even more undesirable. So instead of solving an issue, it only creates 2 (making staking less attractive, and it might cause current stakers to unbond because their APR goes down fast)
Bonjour,
I would just like to add that USDC yield via staking is how I became both an investor and then a believer in dydx.
If that yield advantage disappears, dydx becomes less attractive to investors.
Cordialement, Tresgard.
We agree to both. Several other community members, including us, pointed out these issues in the discussions.
The issue that still needs to be addressed, though, is the very high voting power concentration in the top 3 validators.
But adding a single entity (Stride) that controls about as much delegating power as the top validator is hardly a big improvement. This is especially true because Stride hand-picks its validators and doesnāt use a fair, algorithmic approach such as @pSTAKE. This leads to incentives for validators who receive a sizable portion of stake (and hence income) not to vote against anything Stride-related.
@antonio pointed out that a community-centered staking program would be best, and we agree. It would still reduce stakerās APR but could gradually increase in size as trading rewards allow.
We would still be open to managing such a program.
Proper validator behaviour would be to at least Abstain on proposals where a validator would benefit. It is a difficult balance ofcourse, but it is also important to avoid any feeling of a conflict of interests.