Hey, some interesting points brought up in this great thread so far.
My concern with with a governance validator is that it interferes with the crucial role validators play in securing blockchains. Proof of stake incentives rely on validators competing by following the rules of the chain as efficiently as possible. Whoever runs a delegate validator will have different economics to the rest (better or worse) and this could upset the equilibrium incentives. There is also the potential for centralisation this creates at a validator level. DYDX holders could actually be put off delegating for this reason.
As an alternative I think it is much more prudent to find a way that motivates validators to partner with a delegate. Governance could become part of their offering and Iâm sure a market rate for this service would appear through time. If validator Alice can get 10% more stake by delegating to Bob for governance then she should be willing to pay Bob for this otherwise someone else will.
As a community my preference would be to discuss what would enable delegates to naturally justify their value.
Itâs crucial to realise that the future of dYdX governance doesnât necessarily require an adaptation of our current structures. Rather, we should be exploring an entirely new, autonomous, and decentralised governance framework.
Presently, our reliance on centralised trusts, manual processes, and endorsed delegates doesnât align with the new paradigm that v4 ushers in. Trying to retrofit our existing systems into this new ecosystem seems like a step backward. We ought to be innovating, not clinging to the old ways.
To this end, we have developed a flow chart illustrating a new governance framework. It presents a truly autonomous and decentralised model, delivering cost-effective and efficient solutions. We would present a comprehensive overview for this framework, however, our efforts to obtain funding for research and for the drafting of this have been met with resistance. Carl, for instance, believes that itâs premature to define a governance framework for dYdX v4 due to the quantity of unknowns according to him. We respectfully disagree with this outlook. Rather than adopting a wait-and-see approach, we believe in acting with a sense of urgency. In our view, we should be actively seeking and building better solutions. Otherwise, we are just kicking the can further down the road.
Nonetheless, we firmly believe that our proposed structure holds promise for the future of dYdX. While some may resist changes due to personal interests or a desire to maintain control, itâs worth considering the benefits of moving towards a fully autonomous and decentralised system.
Our commitment should be to forward-thinking, not clinging to whatâs comfortable.
Hereâs the current flowchart for your reference:
We just started looking into the governance on dYdX and have been very curious about how dYdX can support the idea of Endorsed Delegates in the v4 world.
Iâm seeing interesting discussions and ideas in this post and the other one but they didnât look to get close to the consensus yet.
I believe you are the one who has been working on the research funded by Grants DAO and we would like to hear the current progress and thoughts on this matter.
I would like to continue the discussion on the evolution of Endorsed Delegates now that the dYdX chain is live!
I think a good approach is for Endorsed Delegates to work with Validators and divide the work of governance and processing blocks.
How can we add the x/authz module so Endorsed Delegates can start working with validators?
Hello @Ax07
This is Anil from Witval validator.
The simple path I see is asking validators to delegate their governance power to Endorsed Delegates via authz. You can use tools like ours (Resolute | dYdX) for voting on governance proposals via authz access. All you get to do is enable authz mode on Resolute and vote on the proposals.
It would also still require that an endorsed delegate works with a validator. So the validator would effectively choose the endorsed delegate, and not the community.
Where I would think it would be desireable if the community chooses where they would want their voting power delegated, right?
I think there is a real market for splitting the tech and the âsofterâ side of blockchains. Let the tech-master focus on what they do best, yielding very secure systems and resilient chains. While also achieving the softer side through governators (or whatever fancy name we can think of). Iâll be watching the developments closely on this topic.
I think it would be great if dYdX v3 endorsed delegates collaborate with validators in v4 for governance discussions and votings, to leverage and combine the long-term expertise that endorsed delegates already have about dYdX. When choosing validators to collaborate, I think it is relevant for endorsed delegates to especially look at the overall score of dYdX Chain validators aggregating the scores of great uptime, high governance participation, high number of individual and unique delegators and low commission. The top 10 dYdX validators currently with the best overall total score are the following:
I like this idea! How would the cooperation work?
Should delegates instruct validators how to vote? It might make perfect sense.
One callout about governance participation. Mintscan calculates participation from vote 1.
If validators join later, they have to catch up, and will never reach 100%, because you cannot vote on polls that already passed.
StableLab has voted on every poll since we spun our validator up. But since we started after vote 6, we are far from 100% (at 65% now).
This means governance participation metrics can be misleading.
Also âLedger by Meriaâ ranked on spot 10 is worrying, since it is a white-label operator. Are we going to promote those as well over validators who take care of their own operations?
Keplr
Imperator
Crosnet