Since the genesis of dYdX Chain on October 26, 2023, dYdX Chain has generated $232B in trading volume and distributed $39M in USDC to dYdX Chain validators and stakers.
On August 12, 2024, dYdX Trading announced the dYdX Unlimited software featuring significant improvements to the dYdX Chain open-source software, such as permissionless market listings, MegaVault, the potential for revenue sharing, and an Affiliate Program, among other things.
Despite product achievements, the DYDX token has been facing challenges due to high inflation and a significant amount of token unlocks. We believe that dYdX Unlimited presents a unique opportunity to optimize dYdX Chain and DYDX tokenomics for the protocolâs long-term viability and success. Our proposals aim to (1) improve liquidity on dYdX Chain markets, (2) increase the attractiveness of the DYDX token, and (3) encourage holding and staking DYDX, all with a view to increasing the security of the dYdX Chain and driving sustainable growth in the dYdX ecosystem.
To achieve this goal, we recommend implementing revenue sharing, enhancing DYDX token utility, and reducing DYDX emissions, all while supporting the immediate growth requirements of the dYdX Chain. Implementing these changes will significantly enhance dYdXâs competitiveness and reduce DYDX inflation. This will turn the DYDX token into a more robust asset, therefore benefiting the overall security and resiliency of the network.
Our extensive analysis of the proposal can be found in our research report.
Based on the communityâs feedback, we are splitting up the proposals based on subject matter. The four separate proposals (and threads) are as follows:
Reduce the Trading Rewards âCâ constant from 0.90 to 0.5.
Protocol Revenue Distribution:
a. 50% of all protocol revenue routed to the MegaVault.
b. 10% of all protocol revenue routed to the Treasury subDAO.
c. Recommendation that above an $80M level of annual protocol revenue, the Treasury subDAO could consider a Buy & Stake program.
Reduce the active set from 60 to 30 validators.
Cease support for the wethDYDX Smart Contract (i.e., the Bridge) on the dYdX Chain side.
Summary of Recommendations
Reduce the active set from 60 to 30 validators.
Reduce the active set from 60 to 30 validators
The current active validator set on the dYdX Chain consists of 60 validators. At the current fee level, over 17 active validators are unprofitable after accounting for a fixed infrastructure cost of $1,000 per month at their respective commission rates. The proposed MegaVault and dYdX Treasury subDAO revenue shares would further reduce staking yields and, therefore, the funding validators receive from their respective commission, exacerbating unprofitability.
Of the total revenue, 50% is allocated to MegaVault and 10% to the Treasury subDAO. At current commission rates, in a set of 60 validators, 34 would incur losses, while in a 45-validator set, 19 would remain unprofitable. Meanwhile, increasing validator commission to boost profitability would lower staking APR. This could potentially encourage unbonding while discouraging staking. The equilibrium bonded ratio to achieve the current staking APR would decline and thus, impact dYdX Chain security.
We proposed reducing the active validator set from 60 to 30, ensuring that all validators in the active set have a chance to remain profitable after accounting for MegaVault and Treasury subDAO revenue shares at current commission rates. We have conducted a thorough analysis of the proposals. For more details, please refer to our research report.
Community feedback indicated strong interest in exploring potential latency and performance improvements from reducing the validator set.
This was followed by valuable community input, highlighted below.
Hi! The reduction of trading rewards down to 0.5 will make service fees unfavourable compared to other exchanges with more stable API and better liquidity.
Your analysis about profitability and recommendation is based on very wrong costs assumptions, and many already asked you to stop discussing profitability as a reason to eliminate validators given your incorrect assumptions for the analysis:
Not only your assumptions are very incorrect, but you also overlooked the fact that you would actually make latency much worse if the bottom validators are mostly based in Japan while the top ones no.
You are also overlooking the Optimistic Execution in CometBFT v0.38 with ABCI++ that will be introduced in a few days in the next dYdX upgrade and that it will already improve latency by a lot:
To summarize:
Nethermind suggestion: Based on very incorrect costs assumptions with no supporting research/data/surveys we suggest to remove the bottom 30 validators for profitability concerns
Community suggestion:
-Nethermind costs assumptions are very incorrect, hence profitability cannot be used as an argument to remove the bottom 30 validators
-Nethermind missed the main point and advantage to reduce validators which is latency improvement
-Nethermind missed that in the next upgrade latency will already improve by a lot thanks to Optimistic Execution
-Nethermind missed that for latency, validators being based in Japan is the most important metric and that to maximize latency improvement we would need to remove the validators not based in Japan
-If Nethermind was suggesting to remove validators not based in Japan to improve latency this could make sense, but this was suggested by community members, not Nethermind in their report. However, Nethermind still insists in removing the bottom 30 validators which not only makes no sense given their incorrect costs assumptions to reach that conclusion, but this would actually damage latency since validators based outside Japan is not equal to the bottom 30 validators
Not going to mince my words on this, this is a great proposal to alienate your community ahead of one of your biggest competitorâs mainnet launch.
The north star metric for improving chain performance is to reduce latency, and that can be achieved by having nodes in close proximity (Japan) or centralizing the Valset (reduction). Iâm no researcher but the extreme Valset change should be plan of last resort because of the significant logistics and relationships involved (redelegations, shut off of validator operations for validators who supported DYDX at a loss since genesis, etc.). We should only be explore this after geographical latency is optimized, and certainly not at 50% reduction (start small, test, step up).
Also, I cannot emphasize enough that reducing the Valset will not help with the PA or tokenomics - that is just redistributing the same emissions over a smaller set of operators.
The top 30 validators are definitely (incentivized) to vote in line with this so I expect this proposal to pass.
I still do not see any hard evidence or simulation on what kind of performance gains we are talking about here in terms of consensus times when we cut the valset by half.
I guess the cartel wants to increase profitability because removing half the valset will mean that thousands of stakers currently staked in the 31-60 validators are going to be forced to re-allocate their stake to the top 30 - ironically these stakers are the ones being punished for supporting decentralized validators not in the top half.
@antonio decision to lay off 35% of dydx staff coupled with this kind of move towards centralization speaks volumes about the ecosystem here.
There is already plenty of scope to increase throughput if this is a desired metric, we should do this first.
I should also mention the original proposal had nothing to do with this metric, but was instead solely about imposing an economic business decision on validators.
It would be a massive fumble to have less validators than hyperliquid (39 on testnet as of right now)
it would be embarrassing for dydx to suddenly be more centralised than hyperliquid.
Someone please enlighten me on why are we taking suggestions and proposals from @nethermind seriously when their report uses terms like inflationary staking rewards? And killing half of the chainâs infrastructure service providers?
There has been lack of communication around the concerns, and then trying to spin off it off from an economic decision to a performance suggestion, and then again ignoring all those suggestions (to how we can improve with simple configs changes).
From a performance standpoint, reducing the number of validators to provide traders with a better experience is a logical approach.
However, failing to clearly justify the choice of 30 validators may lead to conflicts within the community.
I believe it would be more prudent to gradually reduce the number of validatorsâprogressing from 60 to 50, then to 40, and so forthâby establishing a clear timeline. This would allow for a balanced assessment of performance improvements at each stage.