In my opinion, none of these proposals, except for reducing C, will positively impact the token price; in fact, they might do the opposite.
It’s clear that if we reduce staking rewards, we decrease the token’s attractiveness.
Moving 40% of revenue to the MegaVault seems very strange. So far, the Vaults haven’t proven anything and are running at a loss of around 10% APY (a very rough estimate, as there’s no detailed report on the Vaults).
On one hand, the idea of paying for liquidity in USDC is appealing, but on the other hand, how does the token fit into this?
I think if we want to incentivize liquidity, we need a hybrid model. For example, a user could become an LP in the MegaVault if they lock a certain amount of dydx tokens for a period of time. The longer the lock, the higher the percentage they might earn on their capital and/or have higher available limits as an LP.
In this format, directing a portion of the protocol’s revenue makes sense.