I am referring to this grant dYdX Grant: Long-Tail Market Making on dYdX
It’s insane $2.5k per market. Raven Dao is paid ~70k a month
Most of these markets are generating less in fees than paid to a market maker.
If you check for some of the markets like 60% volume is between Xenophon Labs deployed vaults($50k for service and $200k LP) and Raven DAO.
In my opinion it’s insane overpayment
Man, i don’t even understand why new niche markets are constantly being added when there is not much interest from traders. Doesn’t that just burn money? Do these markets really attract (new) users?
The low volumes are probably also related to big spreads and lacking liquidity, which you want to improve, yes. But even with deep liquidity and no spread I doubt there will be much „real“ volume for a lot of markets because they have a small community.
I’d suggest to do a poll/research amongst dydx users… like why do ppl use dydx in the first place? How many ppl come here for tokens like BODEN, MOG, MOTHER… ?
Big reason for me was decentralization/no KYC etc. for example. What should we change or focus on instead.
Since we are always generous with treasury, we could also offer a small reward as an incentive to get as many people as possible to participate in a poll😂
It is a worthwhile exploration on add Long-Tail markets, but if we find it to be incorrect, it may be better to stop going on.
The purpose of my post is not to stop the financing of long tail markets, but to discuss specifically its effectiveness and start a community discussion on this topic, after all there is already some data that can be analyzed
Unfortunately the forum has become a completely useless place, we spend $80k a month on DEP and in 10 days, no one has taken the time to comment on an active grant.
Sick.
When a grant is given, nothing needs to be done anymore since execution is always flawless >.<
13 hours ago additional $500k was transferred to Xenophon Labs. And RavenDAO got 161k.
Can we finally see any data showing how this money is working for the growth of the project?
@carlbergman @RoboMcGobo @max-holloway @Carlos_Raven
Why these look very inefficient to me. I use IMX-USD as example. This market is live for exactly 5 month. And the total Net Fees for this market is $1672 (one thousand six hundred seventy two).
$329 in July while we are paying $2500 per month. And it’s just one market which is not the worst
I think it’s an interesting conversation, and I believe the real issue lies in the architecture used to generate these markets. It’s important to highlight that the great success of the long tail market, as seen with Uniswap, allowed for market creation at virtually zero cost and without the need for market makers. The order book structure, in my opinion, implies costs that make it unfeasible to have extremely small markets. These markets also have a much higher capital cost, being a derivatives market and requiring sufficient margins to sustain positions. The possibility of not allowing collaterals with the underlying asset seems practically impossible in these types of markets. I think the strategy of paying market makers to start markets would only make sense in potentially large markets. I don’t think it’s a viable strategy for the long tail. I believe that enabling vaults for automated market making could open the door to creating this long tail. I completely agree that the forum does not seem to be a tool where there is interest in discussing these kinds of challenges openly, as the teams or providers executing them are not participating.
Hey @RealVovochka,
Thanks for bringing this up – we’re actually in the middle of revisiting our approach. I’ll share some more context below.
First, why bootstrap liquidity on dYdX? Liquidity is the biggest priority for any trading venue. Without liquidity, users trade with poor execution, or worse, don’t trade at all. The user experience is entirely dependent on liquidity. No liquidity, no users.
But why pay for liquidity on long-tail markets? Higher volatility, fewer hedging options, and adverse selection make these markets much riskier for market makers. Since there’s no incentive for market makers to provide liquidity, orderbooks are left practically empty . This hurts the dYdX brand and reputation. What do you think happens when a user onboards to trade a newly listed long-tail and finds an empty orderbook with +20% spreads? I think there’s a good chance they leave and never come back.
That’s where we come in. To improve the user experience, and make dYdX a more competitive venue, the DEP has engaged two methods of liquidity support for markets in need: Dedicated Market Makers (DMM) and Vaults.
The DMM strategy employs external market making firms, including Raven and Velar Technologies today, to provide their own capital and trading algorithms. These firms take on the responsibilities and risks in return for monthly compensation. The Vaults strategy, on the other hand, includes depositing our own capital into the new AMM-style liquidity provisioning product. Vault deposits are not risk free - they can lose money in certain situations like excessive one-way directional flow. Funding differences aside, the two strategies yield nearly the same results in terms of improving top of book liquidity and tightening the spreads.
To your point on costs, the DMM strategy doesn’t scale very well. With each new market listed, the DEP increases its costs of liquidity support. What happens if 200 more markets get listed next week?
This is why our focus is shifting towards vaults. Vaults are risky, but deposits could also be recovered in full – meaning we spent no money on liquidity. As of today, the DEP has deployed $248k across 20 vaults. The equity across all the vaults currently sits at ~$246k, suggesting a loss of about $2k. Since we started this initiative in early June, withdrawing all of our capital today would mean we spent only $2k for two months of liquidity on 20 markets. At times, this number has been positive – it fluctuates based on activity.
The latest release (v5.2.0) includes support for up to 150 live vaults, an increase from the previously supported 20. With this upgrade, our plan is now for the DEP to transition most of its existing markets supported via DMMs to Vaults. The goal is to reduce our immediate costs while maintaining competitive liquidity across all markets. Eventually, the LP Vaults product will become accessible to external deposits, at which point we hope to see more capital flow in so we can withdraw our original deposits. We don’t expect the DEP to keep bootstrapping liquidity long term.
Finally, why are we paying for markets with little to no trading activity? Any live market should include competitive liquidity to maintain a strong reputation and guarantee a good user experience. What if a new user onboards tomorrow with the intention of trading IMX? We still face the same problem of reputational damage when dealing with live markets. Instead, I think an open question for the community to discuss is whether certain markets should be delisted given their current lack of demand. For example, would it make sense to delist existing markets that have 0 trading volume? As a reminder, the community can delist markets via governance.
Interesting information, and thanks for sharing the explanation of the strategic decisions. To contribute, I would comment that if the strategy is permissionless listing, we should understand that there will be markets without sufficient liquidity, and this should not be seen as a reputational issue. On Uniswap, there are pairs with extreme illiquidity that are continuously listed, and it is not perceived as a reputational problem for the protocol. The protocol’s measures in this regard are to warn in the interface about these slippages to try to prevent a user from incurring them when we have a situation of limited liquidity. Although we are not yet in that phase, I believe the philosophy should be the same, even now that there is a prior vote that is approved in most cases. I think those measures to prevent such trades and even a filter within the dYdX interface to not show illiquid markets or at least separate them would be a better measure than delisting them or having them become an unsustainable cost source.
As I previously suggested, I believe one of the most interesting ways to achieve liquidity in each market is to make a cash & carry strategy available to users. In general, the complexity of liquidity is providing a counterparty to short positions, especially for highly volatile tokens. When we talk about competitiveness, we certainly talk about slippage, but I believe the funding rate is one of the main costs to consider to be competitive. The cash & carry strategy directly addresses these two critical factors. Another different strategy is to have a fund that covers traders’ losses, which historically is what leverage produces and could be captured by dYdX instead of being given to the market. This should be a more general Vault of the project, but in any case, I believe it is something so strategic that outsourcing this type of activity is really a bad decision
Hey @carlbergman ,
Thanks for your reply.
I don’t have any particular complaints about Vaults at the moment, apart from some transparency issues. It would be helpful to publish:
I personally found a list of active Vaults through the API, but not all community members can do this.
Why are Xenophon Labs suddenly experts in market making? Maybe they are, but there’s no public information about it.
The community needs data.
Yes, I agree that liquidity is crucial for new markets and a great user experience. But the question is at what price. I’m sure “what if” scenarios are not a basis for business decisions (like your example with IMX), and in this case, the spread is more of a decorative indicator; the depth of liquidity is very small anyway.
Most of the new markets lately have been proposed by one user, and the current governance features mean validators will vote in favor without even examining them. Is that a reason to pay $2.5K a month to maintain liquidity right away? I think there needs to be a real indicator of users’ willingness to trade.
I’m all for DMM if dydx can create a new market faster than its competitors. If some hot new coin had TGE and we can start offering a trading pair immediately, it makes total sense to use DMM. But now this is not possible; the voting period is quite long, etc.
Paying for liquidity in half-dead markets with no sign that users want to trade them is money burn. Who said it is reputational damage? Totally agree with @cryptoplaza on this topic. And who said that the main competitive advantage of dydx is a high number of markets?
I never suggested withdrawing liquidity from Vaults, but I would like an explanation of why another $500K was sent to Xenophon without any prior discussion of the intermediate results of this experiment with the community.
Who is going to do that and propose such proposals? Don’t tell me that you will pay Chaos Labs again, as it was with the grant where you paid $900 for a report on a new market that took 30 minutes max to create.
I’d be happy to continue the discussion on this topic if you provide more specifics and respond in a reasonable timeframe.
Hey man, long time no correspondence 
. Hope you’ve been well.
Why are Xenophon Labs suddenly experts in market making? Maybe they are, but there’s no public information about it.
Tell me how you really feel 
. I wouldn’t describe us as experts! But Xenophon Labs has done some research on market-making related stuff in the past; analyzing MM on uniswap, looking at dYdX HFT-related trading efficacy, and thinking through market maker experience w.r.t. MEV on dYdX chain. But honestly we’re not experts, just willing to put in the work to analyze the vaults performance. And at the end of the day the vault performance isn’t that complicated to measure: number go up?.
I don’t have any particular complaints about Vaults at the moment, apart from some transparency issues.
Hmm, it’s all on-chain, so people can take a look at it if they’re interested.
Would you mind sharing the query you used to find the vaults list via API? That would help anyone who’s interested in finding the vaults addresses, and they can then look at the vault performance via https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=<VAULT_ADDRESS>.
I don’t have an aggregated dashboard for vault performance, and I don’t intend to make one. However, I still intend to release research on efficacy of vaults, which will obviously have the performance numbers.
Thank you for your reply. I am doing great.
Correct me if I am wrong because there is not much detailed information about how Vaults operate. As I understand by analogy with market making bots , there is a strategy with a certain set of parameters, in this case what is the role of Xenophon?
To define the Vaults strategy? Or just do money management, collect statistics and evaluate efficiency and safety, if the latter then my question about Xenophon’s competence is cancelled. If the former, then I would like to see some credentials that Xenophon has successfully (profitably) engaged in market making business.
As for API, you can use the following request
grpcurl -d '{}' dydx-grpc.publicnode.com:443 dydxprotocol.vault.Query/AllVaults
And the API response where owner is the address of the Vault as I understand
{
"vaultId": {
"type": "VAULT_TYPE_CLOB",
"number": 10
},
"subaccountId": {
"owner": "dydx165fla2xss0wrg8rr04x3e46mneat4fckrcf429"
},
"equity": "AgIpHwoU",
"inventory": "AwL68IA=",
"totalShares": {
"numShares": "AgJUC+QA"
}
},
grpcurl can be installed using brew
But as I wrote in the previous post I have almost no questions about Vaults, but a lot of questions about DMM. But thanks for the comments in this thread
For those who is interested
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx165fla2xss0wrg8rr04x3e46mneat4fckrcf429
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1ypya4270fm4gujvktk67ldvru3y2nx7pvud7ej
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx15t8hzcu3exjnh7lp4ks2m0qzcpfmjw7wnq0fvr
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1key68rph9mtmm09f5udr58pfyq586dqr56zusw
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1esh4d4rdl58lqauha8met8g78xry52ry3nnmw6
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1cnd3ftpvqr3khjsfn6ptz0a8fzd99p4dnmkt2l
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx16fg2j83kkzwz9ghqrdgatzsnsfz7mzknz0e8yw
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx12dffextgdnvrv349krs2thvhcdnwr4850d35h7
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx19ykejm094kzj054wt3lks3fk9kuwfu9h0z8hcs
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx10vwegs2dyjm6443uqpp0y7v9u4snmcnu5wpgnr
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1qsyv2ug8y0m5xgapfr6avrj9ktu79pyq49pphg
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1l04nf4udw7swyrzge66j66n09ry4aawfm4xd07
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1kywd7tcyvpwx8j6dc7t5733wmum4k2dq68trn6
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1m0pn0ygh37qp345rd44scq58ch7e4h0wfpdrcs
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1vvdpmwsyum9r5y92c3gpks5ednxqazfmpjv8qf
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1rtkg76uvpll6jhvm79knsrqaf9vx48wcfn7she
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx186d03739dhkt8eeqahql3dcscyvgh9f6gsuzxn
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1c5atsq350zsdwzld4e9k648cx4rkr9792e4xtp
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1mt66ymx2vv7dzct3t0h6m3afln4s235jf0esja
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx127pntl3k27tfqaqs2f6nqu6vcndfnamt7ylv0c
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx16hklzgswcw9w4xhh4vdajlclaghwzgmr2m6hlp
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1c6s0pg7hsc9enyr4nn9vhmyk8yps3wkhvlr0fz
https://dydx.trade/portfolio/overview?address=dydx1y73m286vcnvrjnrcwv7d7l4gs2v2x5r65n7726
There are straightforward solutions to many of these issues. For instance, implementing autonomous daily trading competitions for each new market listed, running for three months post-listing, seems like an obvious way to bootstrap liquidity and encourage trading activity. Numerous simple solutions like this could be easily implemented. However, it appears that self-interests have always been more prominent within DYDX, hindering such initiatives.
All good questions. I’ll share brief responses below, but keep in mind this is all very much in motion at the moment. We’ll be sharing a longer update on everything done at a later date.
Sharing two quick dashboards that can be used for live tracking :
Responses:
Hey, @carlbergman
Thanks for the information and the dashboards
This is a good first step towards transparency
I think it is good to add in the information about Vaults : the address of each Vault and the market in which it is deployed
Also I noticed oddities on Vault 73 (Boden) yesterday it was written Capital Contributed: 20k Equity: 0 and PNL = -20k.
Today I see Equity: 5k and PNL: -15k, it looks strange. The total PNL is not counted correctly.
Also I would like to ask @max-holloway what happened to this Vault that it was deleveraged and liquidated?
And remind you the question who is responsible for the Vault strategy which was asked in my previous reply
The Velar and RavenDAO addresses should be added to the DMM information.
I could be wrong but the RavenDAO address is dydx18p7nz5rqezkyscdz9pv9rchnsesjyjjjyfe92t3
The Velar address is unknown to me.
As for your answers on DMM I think it’s worth looking at question #3, I think statistics are the best way to show effectiveness in this case, I hope the DEP gives more detailed information in their report
Since Xenophon Labs @max-holloway conducted research in dydx V3 on optimizing trading rewards, which led to their gradual reduction, I have a few questions in the context of the program from Chaos Labs:
The account that interests me: dydx1u07sdcdrlxyjl9z9l34t8t0ysy5ratycz8u6zq
Thank you