Hi everyone, I’m Kam from Chorus One.
First of all, thanks for sharing this. I would strongly recommend splitting proposals like this into separate governance proposals when moving on-chain.
For example, one proposal for Protocol Revenue Distribution, one for validator profitability, one for Trading Rewards, and one for the Bridge.
The challenge with large, combined changes (something we’ve seen in the past) is that people might agree with certain aspects but disagree with others. This is why it’s crucial to separate them into individual proposals.
Regarding the specific points:
Protocol Revenue Distribution:
Currently, dYdX staking yields around 12%, which is quite attractive for stakers.
The MegaVault seems like it could draw significant USDC liquidity into dYdX and improve market efficiency. We’ve seen how well a similar product worked on Hyperliquid, so it makes sense to allocate a portion of rewards to the MegaVault.
My concern is that if we allocate around 60% of staking rewards to the MegaVault and the Treasury subDAO, the staking yield would drop from
around 12% to 4.8% (assuming other factors remain the same). Why would these new conditions make buying and staking DYDX more appealing than the current setup?
I like this idea if we implemented, the MegaVault will struggle to compete with other similar products in the market that don’t require holding additional tokens (at least for now).
I assume the proposal is mostly a bet on the idea that it will attract more trading volume, which would offset the reduction in trading fees allocated to stakers and operators.