Thanks to ChaosLabs for introducing their formula for v4 Launch Incentives. We want to use the opportunity to provide some insights into what we see as valuable governance activity from our experience in 20+ DAOs.
We want to help incentivize productive and aligned activity in a way that ensures governance activity is not abused for exploits
Valuable governance activity:
- Writing proposals, that get passed
- Voting
- Publishing rationales for voting
- Staking
Governance activity not producing direct value:
- Replies to forum posts
- Forum posts
- Likes
- Discord activity
The ultimate goal of governance activity is to get the DAO to do something. Thanks to the token-weighted voting process, any proposal that gets passed is valid governance output, at least in the regard that it is an expression of what token holders want.
Writing proposals and convincing the community to vote is hard work and necessary for the DAO to evolve. It should be incentivized, especially since incentives would encourage actors who don’t stand to benefit from their passing to write proposals.
Malicious proposals or scam proposals shouldn’t be incentivized and shouldn’t pass. We think governance attacks are a real threat, but we want to keep it simple for this reply.
Voting should also be incentivized because the amount of the active token supply in governance increases the cost of a governance attack, making the protocol more secure. We would advise paying out further incentives to those token holders who publish the rationales for their decisions, educating others, and contributing to the dialogue.
Staking increases the protocol’s security outright and is already incentivized through staking rewards. Should not enough of the token supply be staked, we think it might be sensible to add further incentives, with a sharp eye on what can be maintained over a more extended period.
For the “not valuable” category:
While we think replies, Discord activity, and likes are essential for a thriving governance ecosystem and good decisions, these activities are too easy to farm. Furthermore, the farming activity would endanger the quality of the well-meant and meaningful authentic discourse, negatively impacting honest actors.
We don’t see a straightforward way to incentivize this behavior that doesn’t have adverse second-order effects. One prominent example is MakerDAO’s SourceCred system, discontinued because the community found the signal to noise ratio to leave a lot to desire.
We advise not to incentivize this category.