We don’t agree with this, this won’t have any effect to ‘pump’ the DYDX price, most likely the opposite effect, the staking yield is already very low leading to less incentive to buy DYDX to stake it. Moreover, a lower staking yield would lead to further unstaking and selling of DYDX leading to a negative price impact. Thirdly, the revenue for validators is so low already while the infrastructure and bandwidth costs are some of the highest in Tokyo. The evidence of this is that many dYdX validators have been winding down and to stop this trend and keep the network with enough validators and decentralized the staking rewards % need to be increased, certainly not reduced
This is just pure speculation
This is just not true. The ‘stickiness’ is because the dYdX treasury subDAO, the Foundation and other entities keep the tokens staked, but regular stakers have been leaving due to the low yield and also validators have been leaving because a low staking yield means low validator revenue. The network security and decentralization doesn’t depend only on the stakers variable but in the validators as well, the number of dYdX validators has been dangerously decreasing, the active set was reduced already to 50, but then it had to be reduced to 42 because even there were 50 spots available so many validators have been leaving that there weren’t even enough validators to fill the 50 spots. At this rate, the network will become more centralized over time with just a few validators controlling the network going back to the start, since dYdX v3 moved to v4 and out of Ethereum precisely to improve its decentralization with a decentralized validator set that keeps the orderbook decentralized, and Nethermind is suggesting once again ideas that hurt dYdX’s decentralization. Following the previous proposals of Nethermind what results did we see? Drop in dYdX price, drop in trading volumes, drop in staking yields, many validators winding down operations. The goal and priority right now for dYdX should be 1)How to increase trading volume and remain competitive for the long term and 2)How to increase the revenue for validators so that enough validators remain for the long term with quality infrastructure to ensure that dYdX can remain reliable and decentralized. I recommend to keep 25% for buybacks, 10% for Treasury subDAO and 65% for stakers. Or much better this proposed solution by @staza ‘Proposed Value (for Trial): 100% to buybacks for three months (November 1, 2025 - January 31, 2026); staking rewards for validators/stakers paid from Community Treasury at levels matching current 40% share (estimated ~$2-4M over three months based on annualized fees). Megavault liquidity program remains funded at current levels via treasury if needed to maintain competitiveness.’
Also, Nethermind originally suggested: ‘Protocol Revenue Distribution
a. 50% of all protocol revenue routed to the MegaVault.
b. 10% of all protocol revenue routed to the Treasury subDAO.’, so initially Nethermind suggested up to 50% protocol revenue removed from stakers and used for Megavault, now Nethermind admitted Megavault was a failure and recommends 0% distribution for Megavault. Initially Nethermind didn’t suggest or even mention any % for Buybacks. The other recommendations of Nethermind to halve the validator set received strong opposition and centralization concerns and was not implemented, and the other suggestion to close the Bridge has now led to a lot of community pressure and upset ethDYDX long term holders. And these failed recommendations of Nethermind were funded with large amounts of money from dYdX Grants which also questions how dYdX Grants is using money that should bring value to dYdX and not the opposite.
Buybakcs were only first mentioned a few months ago in March 2025 dYdX Launches First-Ever DYDX Buyback Program did this buyback program provide any results? In March 2025 the DYDX token price was around $0.65 and currently it is $0.3, over a 50% price drop since the introducion of buybacks. Before the introduction of buybacks the DYDX price was always much higher which shows buybacks didn’t bring any DYDX price ‘pump’ but rather the opposite. I suggest to change the % for Megavault and Buybacks to 0%, for treasury to 5% since it is well funded already and 95% for stakers and it was before and the original idea when moving from v3 to v4