80% of fees to buybacks for 3 months

Summary: This DRC proposes a three-month trial to send 100% of dYdX Chain’s net trading fees to DYDX buybacks. This boosts token value accrual, similar to Hyperliquid’s model. During the trial, validator and staker rewards come from the Community Treasury to keep network security strong without splitting fees. The goal is to test better P/E ratios and market cap efficiency amid current undervaluation. It reverts automatically after three months unless governance extends it. This builds on the previous DYDX Buyback Program DRC, which set the initial 25% allocation.

Background: dYdX Chain splits net trading fees like this: 25% to DYDX buybacks, 40% to staking rewards for validators and stakers, 25% to Megavault liquidity, and 10% to treasury. The buyback program, proposed in the March 2025 DRC by the Treasury SubDAO (reference: [DRC] dYdX Treasury SubDAO DYDX Buyback Program ) and implemented gradually, has bought over 5M DYDX tokens by October 2025 using about 25% of fees (reference: Buybacks Dashboards ). It involved reducing Megavault’s share in stages and using TWAP for purchases on exchanges like Binance, followed by staking. But with annualized fees at $20-40M from recent protocol revenue and a market cap of ~$320M at $0.333/DYDX, the token has a low P/E of ~8-16, showing undervaluation. Hyperliquid uses 99% of fees for buybacks through its Assistance Fund, leading to big token price gains. Recent X posts and community talks suggest trying full buybacks to give more value to DYDX holders, while paying validators from the large Community Treasury ($100M+ in assets) to avoid fee dilution. The prior buyback DRC highlighted benefits like aligning holders, enhancing security via staking, and generating extra USDC rewards, but community feedback noted concerns over Megavault competitiveness, limited price impact from buybacks, and the need for expense audits to reduce token sales. This trial runs for three months to check results and address those points experimentally.

Objective: Run a short experiment to improve DYDX tokenomics by maxing out fee accrual via buybacks from November 2025 to January 2026. This could buy back ~$5-10M worth of tokens (~15-30M DYDX at $0.333), building on the prior program’s ~1.55% max supply buyback potential at lower allocations. It keeps network security with treasury-funded rewards and gathers data on price effects, fee levels, and feedback before any permanent change.

Proposal Details:

  • Parameter: Net protocol fee distribution ratios (temp change for trial).

  • Current Value: 25% buybacks, 40% staking rewards, 25% Megavault liquidity, 10% treasury.

  • Proposed Value (for Trial): 100% to buybacks for three months (November 1, 2025 - January 31, 2026); staking rewards for validators/stakers paid from Community Treasury at levels matching current 40% share (estimated ~$2-4M over three months based on annualized fees). Megavault liquidity program remains funded at current levels via treasury if needed to maintain competitiveness.

  • Rationale: The current split weakens fee value accrual to DYDX. A three-month trial at 100% buybacks copies Hyperliquid’s 99% approach, testing how it drives token scarcity and price growth without locking in forever, as suggested in the prior DRC’s future considerations for scaling to 100%. With monthly fees at ~$1.67-3.33M, it could reduce supply meaningfully, fixing the low valuation (P/E 16 on $320M cap / $20M fees; 33 on $540M FDV / $40M fees adjusted). Treasury covers validators to maintain security without inflation or fee cuts, leveraging existing funds and addressing community concerns about overspending by avoiding new token sales. Post-trial, it auto-reverts; check success with metrics like price shifts, buyback amounts, staking APR impacts (previously estimated at 6%), and polls. Use similar operations as the prior program: TWAP purchases on Binance or Osmosis, then stake tokens to boost network security and generate extra USDC.

Impact Assessment:

  • Technical Impact: Low risk; needs governance-ok’d updates to fee distributor module with a sunset clause to revert after 92 days. Perks include auto buybacks on open market and staking the tokens, similar to the prior program’s staking integration which raised projected annual USDC rewards.

  • Economic Impact: Good for DYDX holders with short-term scarcity and real yield. Gives data on market cap lift via better P/E, potentially exceeding the prior DRC’s scenario of $7-13M annual buybacks at 25% allocation. Costs: Small treasury drawdown (~$2-4M for rewards), easy to handle; track with end-trial report including expense audit to address feedback. Risks: Lower fees mean slower buybacks, but short time limits harm; treasury cushion avoids validator shortfalls and maintains Megavault APR.

  • Social Impact: Builds community trust with experimental testing; validators keep pay steady. Helps traders (fees unchanged) and holders (gains).

Next Steps:
I’m looking for all possible options as a feedback from the community which can then be incorporated into the submission of a formal governance proposal.

Updated version based on all discussions

3 months trial with the following fees distribution:
Buybacks - 80%
Staking - 15%
Community Treasury - 5%
Megavault - 0%

Also for the trial period:
All remaining unlocks must be postponed, Surge and similar rewards programmes which are based on DYDX token must be stopped so that circular supply is not increasing.

CC: @charles @grundydx @grundydx12 @antonio

4 Likes

I completely support the experiment
After that we can work on finding the right balance - similar to the other topic where a 50/50 distribution is suggested

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@Validators, @nethermind, @gauntlet and @kpk your inputs are really needed here :heart_hands:

The MegaVault operator has mandates to provide liquidity on tail markets. These markets are liable to one-sided flow, thus MegaVault investors rely on revenue share as compensation for the risk they take on. With existing mandates, MegaVault liquidity provision is unsustainable without incentives.

Blockquote
Megavault liquidity program remains funded at current levels via treasury if needed to maintain competitiveness.

This would be acceptable

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Thank you for your comment!

UPD: I’m in a discussion with relevant stakeholders to add more specifics to the DRC.

The updated and final version of it will be published here.

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@nethermind posted great review of current state. Perfect timing :ok_hand:

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This is a very good offer. This should have been done even earlier. Increase the value of the token because these prices are really ridiculous and DYDX should be at least $5.

@Cosmic_Validator provided very valuable inputs from the validators PoV under recent report made by Nethermind. (I’m also asking for other @Validators to join this discussion).

I understood the aspects which @Cosmic_Validator provided and I agree that such a significant change in a % split can be harmful for stakers and validators. But additional actions must be also performed to adjust token’s price. Especially considering the current low price = increased buyback volume.

So I purpose the trade off :

Buybacks 60 %

Staking 35 %

Treasury 5 %

Megavault 0 %

This split represents a healthy compromise between aggressive buybacks and sustainable network incentives.

After 3 months of testing we will see the results and we can vote afterwards on whatever it can work as a long-term steady-state allocation or not.

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I disagree with this, I recommend 0% for buybacks and megavault, 5% for treasury and 95% for stakers, my explanation is under the nethermind post discussion, sharing here also: 'Also, Nethermind originally suggested: ‘Protocol Revenue Distribution
a. 50% of all protocol revenue routed to the MegaVault.
b. 10% of all protocol revenue routed to the Treasury subDAO.’, so initially Nethermind suggested up to 50% protocol revenue removed from stakers and used for Megavault, now Nethermind admitted Megavault was a failure and recommends 0% distribution for Megavault. Initially Nethermind didn’t suggest or even mention any % for Buybacks. The other recommendations of Nethermind to halve the validator set received strong opposition and centralization concerns and was not implemented, and the other suggestion to close the Bridge has now led to a lot of community pressure and upset ethDYDX long term holders. And these failed recommendations of Nethermind were funded with large amounts of money from dYdX Grants which also questions how dYdX Grants is using money that should bring value to dYdX and not the opposite.

Buybakcs were only first mentioned a few months ago in March 2025 dYdX Launches First-Ever DYDX Buyback Program did this buyback program provide any results? In March 2025 the DYDX token price was around $0.65 and currently it is $0.3, over a 50% price drop since the introducion of buybacks. Before the introduction of buybacks the DYDX price was always much higher which shows buybacks didn’t bring any DYDX price ‘pump’ but rather the opposite. I suggest to change the % for Megavault and Buybacks to 0%, for treasury to 5% since it is well funded already and 95% for stakers and it was before and the original idea when moving from v3 to v4’

DYDX should introduce a token burn mechanism to improve its flawed tokenomics model.

As far as I remember, they stated buybacks under point C :

That’s really absolutely opposite proposal. But all your points must be discussed.

And I really want to hear more opinions on both options.

Not accurate, they said ‘At a $80M fee level, the treasury subDAO would receive $8 million from a 10% revenue share and earn approximately $3.2 million in staking revenue with 40 million DYDX tokens staked, totaling $11.8 million in projected annual revenue.’, the buy & stake program they were referring to was only related to the 10% fee revenue for the Treasury subdao, not a % of the overall dYdX trading fee revenue directly for buybacks, this was first mentioned and introduced much later in March 2025

Let’s discuss the points then. Megavault we all agree to change the % to 0%. For the Treasury we also agree that it is well funded so around 5% should be enough. This is clear. The discussion is about staking revenue and buybacks. I think buybacks don’t produce any result and just hurts the dYdX protocol by greatly reducing the incentives to stake DYDX and secure the network that’s why I think 95% should be for staking revenue, and for some buybacks experiments use funds from other sources like community treasury, grants or other funds

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@dYdX_Ops_subDAO @dYdX-Ops-SubDAO

Can you please provide current numbers of the balance and spendings for the mentioned sources?

True.

Also I would like to revisit Surge program because it emits significant amount of DYDX token into the market by traders. There should be some incentives implemented so that traders are interested in staking the rewards which they received rather than selling.

I know from the roadmap that Eddie Zhang and the team are developing “Stake for Reduced Fees — Customizable fee tiers will permit the community to reward token stakers with reduced trading fees.” which should help here but what’s your opinion on that?

Exactly, that’s why 95% revenue share should go to stakers, so traders will be more interested to stake the DYDX rather than selling, and the other ideas of stake for reduced fees are good but more important to have good staking rewards. Overall, yes staking should be incentivized much more, starting with the lowest hanging fruit is is moving back the share of revenue for stakers to 95%

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Agree that staking yield MUST be higher, what is the utility of the token?

Agree that Megavault is failure (I was advocating not starting it when it was in a test phase)

Stimulating of the traders should be done only through fee discounts for staking the token. Surge Program and any stimulation in token must be stopped.

What’s the point of buybacks if those same tokens end up getting spent from the treasury? Expenses should also be cut. All subDAOs and the Foundation should only be funded from the yield from token staking, no token sales.

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Great points. Buybacks remove revenue from stakers, then these DYDX are actually given away to traders who then sell the tokens, so instead of rewarding stakers this set up is rewarding some traders farmings these DYDX rewards to then sell them, moving revenue away from long term DYDX holders and stakers and giving it to farming traders. The Treasury is staking DYDX and getting revenue from the staking yield, I agree that all other dYdX entities should do the same and be funded from staking rewards, because why do buybacks to ‘pump’ the price if then all dYdX entities are dumping much larger amounts of DYDX?

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To understand better there should be a financial report on all token spendings. OpsDao burns 400k usd a month, grants at previous management of reverie had like 300k/ month spending. $1m+ in tokens for surge.

I think the decision how much to allocate to buybacks, staking must be based on the data. Maybe @kpk as Treasury SubDao can prepare such report?

3 Likes

Totally agree. We need to have full clarity before making proposal.
Thanks both of you,@RealVovochka and @Cosmic_Validator, for active participation!

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