dYdX Treasury SubDAO Community Update — H1 2026

[KPK]

KPK is pleased to present the dYdX Treasury SubDAO’s H1 2026 Community Update, highlighting key developments and initiatives for the last 6 months.

In our 2025 Review & 2026 Outlook we set out three goals for 2026: expanding buyback activity under the distribution framework introduced by Proposal #313, continuing the periodic review cadence of the Staking Programme, and pursuing onchain liquidity management on Osmosis. This update reports progress against each of them and covers one material development we did not anticipate at the time — the Treasury SubDAO’s first external DeFi deployment, funded by a governance proposal that put idle Insurance Fund capital to work.

TL;DR

H1 2026 was a half of uninterrupted execution plus one structural change: for the first time, the Treasury SubDAO put treasury stablecoins to work outside staking.

• Buyback Programme: 8.61 M DYDX repurchased for USDC 1.09 M across 20,906 orders, taking cumulative repurchases past 22 M DYDX since the April 2025 launch. Every repurchased token is staked.

• Staking Programme: 88.10 M DYDX — effectively 100% of the treasury’s DYDX — remained staked across 31 validators, generating approximately USDC 44 k.

• First external DeFi deployment: Proposal #372 released idle Insurance Fund capital, and on 13 May 2026, the treasury deposited 500,000 USDC into the KPK USDC Prime Core vault on Morpho at approximately 3.7% net APY.

• Financials: USDC 1.17 M received as working capital to deploy, against USDC 51 k of revenue generated. Assets under management closed the half at approximately $20.55 M, 79.7% utilised.

• Against the 2026 goals: the buyback framework expanded as planned, though lower protocol revenue meant less capital deployed; the Staking Programme delivered; and the Osmosis liquidity initiative was deprecated in favour of more productive deployment.

Financial Update

It is worth drawing a distinction that matters for reading the figures below. The Treasury SubDAO receives two very different kinds of inflow:

• Working capital, being the protocol revenue-share allocations the treasury receives in order to deploy them, principally the budget that funds DYDX repurchases. This is capital passing through the treasury, not income it has earned.

• Revenue, being what the treasury actually generates on the assets that capital is deployed into: staking rewards and DeFi results.

Working capital received

During H1 2026, the Treasury SubDAO received approximately USDC 1.17 M in protocol revenue-share allocations, an average of approximately USDC 195 k per month, comprising of:

• Buyback budget (the 75% share of net protocol revenue allocated to repurchases): USDC 1,095,507

• Treasury allocation: USDC 72,998

The table below provides the monthly detail for Figure 1, separating the buyback budget from the treasury’s own allocation.

Month	Buyback budget (USDC)	Treasury allocation (USDC)	Total (USDC)
January	209,703	13,947	223,649
February	235,105	15,673	250,779
March	220,078	14,671	234,749
April	184,643	12,309	196,952
May	169,309	11,287	180,596
June	76,669	5,111	81,779
H1 2026	1,095,507	72,998	1,168,505

Table 1: Protocol allocations received by month, USDC

Monthly allocations declined through the half, tracking lower protocol trading volumes across a market-wide drawdown. The Buyback Programme that these capital funds, and the results it has produced, are set out under Lookback on the Mandate below. For reference, allocations received since the treasury’s inception now total approximately USDC 6.39 M, being both streams combined: USDC 4,377,427 of buyback budget and USDC 2,016,102 of treasury allocation.

Revenue generated

Deployed into staking and, from May 2026, DeFi, that capital generated revenue of approximately USDC 51 k during H1 2026, comprising of:

• Staking Rewards: USDC 44,322

• MegaVault, realised on exit in January: USDC 3,827

• KPK USDC Prime Core vault on Morpho (deposit on 13 May 2026): USDC 2,623

• Osmosis LP incentives, claimed before the position was closed: USDC 354 and 1,674 DYDX

Revenue remains heavily concentrated in staking, which accounted for approximately 87% of the half’s total. The DeFi contribution is small in absolute terms but represents the first half in which the treasury earned anything meaningful outside staking, and only one month of it reflects the Morpho position. For reference, revenue generated since the treasury’s inception now totals approximately USDC 1.78 M, the large majority of it coming from staking rewards earned during 2025.

It should be noted that the lower staking revenue compared to 2025 is not a decline in treasury productivity: Proposal #313 reallocated protocol fees toward repurchases, raising the buyback allocation to 75% while reducing the staking rewards allocation from 40% to 15%. The reduction in staking revenue and the increase in buyback capacity are counterparts of the same decision.

According to the June 2026 monthly report, the following key metrics were observed:

• Approximately $20.55 M of Assets Under Management

• Asset Allocation (Figure 3): 77.1% in DYDX (88.10 M tokens, approximately $15.84 M), 22.9% in stablecoins (approximately $4.71 M).

• Capital utilisation stood at 79.7%, with $16.38 M allocated across staking and DeFi positions and $4.17 M held in wallet balances.

• Yield generation: DeFi strategies generated $4,806 in June, comprising $2,623 from the KPK USDC Prime Core vault on Morpho and approximately $2,183 from the Staking Programme. Across the half, the Staking Programme generated approximately USDC 44 k.

The step-change in April reflects the arrival of the 5 M USDC Insurance Fund allocation under Proposal #372, which took stablecoins from approximately 9% to 31% of the portfolio. The subsequent drift back toward DYDX reflects both continued buyback accumulation and the deployment of stablecoins into yield generation strategy. For context, at 31 January the treasury held 81.71 M DYDX and 898 k USDC. The monthly updates publish allocation percentages rather than a dollar total, but the 92.9% / 7.10% split implies total funds of approximately $12.6 M, so assets under management rose by approximately $7.9 M over the half. Roughly 48% of that increase is the net growth in stablecoins, driven by the 5 M USDC Insurance Fund allocation; approximately 40% is DYDX price recovery from the 31 January snapshot; and approximately 12% is the 6.39 M DYDX added by the Buyback Programme. Little of it is investment performance: DYDX finished the half roughly where it started the year, and the January reference point falls in a trough, which flatters the six-month comparison.

DYDX Token Update

H1 2026 was a broadly risk-off half across digital assets. Against that backdrop, DYDX proved comparatively resilient, ending the half down approximately 13%, while BTC was down approximately -32% and ETH approximately -46%. HYPE was the clear outperformer in the comparative basket.

The table below summarises how each asset in the comparative basket performed over the half.

Asset	H1 2026 return
HYPE	+176%
DYDX	-13%
BTC	-32%
ETH	-46%

Table 2: H1 2026 returns by asset

DYDX traded across a wide band over the half, with monthly averages ranging from approximately $0.185 in January down to approximately $0.089 in March, before recovering to approximately $0.140 in June. The March trough coincided with the Programme’s largest monthly accumulation, which is the intended behaviour of a revenue-funded buyback: the same USDC budget acquires more tokens at lower prices.

Lookback on the Mandate

Staking Programme

Effectively 100% of the treasury’s DYDX remained productively staked throughout the half, closing June at 88.10 M DYDX, up from approximately 85.6 M at year-end 2025. The portion of the staked position sourced from the Buyback Programme grew from 13.6 M to 22.2 M DYDX, an increase of approximately 63% over six months.

Changes over the half included:

• Implementation of Proposal #360, which reduced the active validator set. Approximately 8.8 M DYDX was redelegated to preserve decentralisation, equalise distribution across the updated proposer set, and move stake away from validators no longer in the active set. The Programme closed the half, delegating across 31 active validators.

• An ad-hoc review on 28 April 2026, rotating stake away from five validators and redistributing across six active operators, was undertaken to maintain uptime and preserve diversification.

• The fifth periodic review of the Staking Programme, completed in February 2026, in line with the established delegation principles and validator scoring criteria.

• The Programme generated approximately USDC 44 k over the half. As noted above, the reduced run-rate against 2025 is the direct counterpart of Proposal #313’s reallocation of protocol fees toward repurchases, rather than a decline in staking performance.

Buyback Programme

How the Programme works

The Buyback Programme repurchases DYDX using a defined share of net protocol revenue, set at 75% under Proposal #313. The budget is received by the Treasury SubDAO each month and deployed on an ongoing basis rather than held back for discretionary timing, so accumulation follows revenue rather than a view on price.

The Programme continues to be comprised of 2 types of transactions:

• Open market buyback, executed on a centralised exchange via execution algorithms that minimise market impact — trade sizes are dynamically adjusted with market volume and participation rate — while maintaining execution efficiency, optimising for cost efficiency via passive execution.

• OTC transactions, negotiated directly with other DAO entities. These help to coordinate DAO-wide finances and transactions effectively, reducing transaction costs.

Every repurchased token is staked under the Staking Programme, so the Programme compounds rather than accumulating idle inventory. All buyback-related activity remains fully transparent and can be monitored through the community-built Buyback Dashboard.

Results for the half

The Programme executed continuously throughout H1 2026, acquiring 8,613,633 DYDX for USDC 1,088,155 at an average price of approximately $0.1263, across 20,906 orders. Of this, 7,916,422 DYDX was acquired on the open market at an average of approximately $0.1248, and a single OTC block of 697,211 DYDX was acquired at $0.14343 for USDC 100,000 in February.

Aggregate slippage across the half was close to neutral, with positive slippage — execution better than the measurement benchmark — recorded in March, April and May.

The table below provides the monthly execution details for Figure 5, including the USDC deployed, the average price achieved, and the number of orders.

Month	DYDX acquired	USDC deployed	Average price	Orders
January	889,869	155,948	$0.17525	3,147
February	1,417,855	172,452	$0.12163	1,463 + OTC
March	1,950,055	185,487	$0.09512	3,142
April	1,604,844	171,073	$0.10660	4,099
May	1,382,792	211,484	$0.15294	5,703
June	1,368,218	191,711	$0.14012	3,352
H1 2026	8,613,633	1,088,155	~$0.1263	20,906

Table 3: Buyback Programme execution by month

The half’s 8.61 M DYDX takes cumulative repurchases since the Programme’s launch on April 23rd, 2025 to approximately 22.3 M DYDX for approximately USDC 6.7 M, at a blended average of approximately $0.30 per token — meaning roughly 39% of all DYDX ever repurchased was acquired in this half alone, at well below the programme’s blended average price.

Figure 6: Cumulative DYDX repurchased since launch

Yield Generation

Over H1 2026 the Treasury SubDAO both sourced the capital for stablecoin yield generation and made its first deployment.

Proposal #372 is what unlocked and expanded yield generation for the treasury. Approved on-chain and executed in April, it put idle Insurance Fund capital to productive use, transferring 10 M USDC out of the Insurance Fund — 5 M USDC to the Treasury SubDAO, 2.5 M to the Operations SubDAO and 2.5 M to the dYdX Foundation — while retaining approximately 7 M USDC as protocol backstop.

Under that mandate, on 13 May 2026 the Treasury SubDAO deposited 500,000 USDC into the KPK USDC Prime Core vault on Morpho (Ethereum). The vault was selected on conservative grounds:

• Conservative USDC lending, allocating exclusively to blue-chip collateral markets

• ERC-4626, fully liquid, with no lock-up

• Zero management and performance fees

• Strict per-market caps and tiered risk limits, with automated 24/7 monitoring via KPK’s Rebalancing and Exit Agents

• Net APY of approximately 3.7% at deployment

The position stood at approximately $502.3 k at the end of June, having generated $2,623 in its first full month.

Earlier in the half, the Treasury SubDAO also exited two positions. In January, it fully unwound its MegaVault LP position, where yield had decayed from approximately 10% APY at entry to approximately 1.68% by December 2025, and closed its DYDX/USDC liquidity position on Osmosis, withdrawing approximately 857.57 k DYDX. Both decisions freed capital for more productive deployment ahead of what proved to be a significant market drawdown.

Governance and Reporting

Proposal #365 ratified the Treasury SubDAO Foundation’s Articles of Association and replaced two Class B Directors to reflect organisational changes.

The Treasury SubDAO maintained its full reporting cadence throughout the half, publishing a Community Update and a detailed monthly treasury report every month, alongside each periodic review of the Staking Programme.

Progress Against the 2026 Goals

Our 2025 Review & 2026 Outlook set out three goals for the year. Progress at the halfway mark:

• Buyback expansion. The distribution framework was expanded as planned: Proposal #313 raised the buyback share of net protocol revenue from 25% to 75%. The threefold increase in share did not translate into a threefold increase in deployment, because net protocol revenue fell materially over the same period. The buyback budget averaged approximately USDC 339 k per month during the 25% period of 2025, against approximately USDC 183 k per month in H1 2026 under the 75% allocation — implying net protocol revenue declined by roughly 80%. The Programme nonetheless acquired 8.61 M DYDX over the half, and the lower prices that accompanied the weaker revenue meant more tokens per dollar deployed.

• Staking Programme. Delivered. A periodic review and an ad-hoc review were completed, Proposal #360’s reduction of the active set was implemented, and the Programme closed the half with effectively 100% of the treasury’s DYDX staked across 31 validators.

• Osmosis liquidity. Deprecated. Rather than deepening the USDC/DYDX pair, the initiative was set aside in favour of putting those assets to more productive work, and the position was closed in January. Proposal #372 subsequently ratified that direction by formally allocating idle capital to yield generation. We would revisit on-chain liquidity provision in more constructive market conditions, and welcome community views on whether it should remain a priority.

Looking Forward

The Treasury SubDAO Foundation hopes to continue fine-tuning its execution of the Staking Programme and the Buyback Programme.

For the Staking Programme, we remain committed to periodical reviews of delegation and to updating our Delegation Methodology in line with protocol-level updates and protocol priorities. With the active set now reduced and the treasury’s DYDX balance growing steadily through repurchases, the emphasis for the second half is on maintaining balanced distribution across a smaller proposer set without concentrating stake.

For the Buyback Programme, H1 2026 provided a test that earlier periods lacked: a sustained drawdown rather than an oscillating market. The Programme performed as designed, with most of the accumulation occurring in the March trough. We will continue refining the execution algorithm and venue selection as we gather further evidence of DYDX’s market dynamics across different regimes.

Having made the first stablecoin deployment, the Treasury SubDAO will be exploring the following topics in the next 6 months:

• Deployment of the remaining Insurance Fund allocation into additional conservative, fully liquid yield venues, namely RWA assets and building on the Morpho position.

• Ensure the continuity of a strong validator set by directing delegations to reinforce it.

• Enhance the effectiveness of the buyback programme by deploying improved execution tooling.

We appreciate the trust the dYdX Community has placed in KPK in the management of the Treasury SubDAO Foundation, and are committed to ongoing engagement with the community and contributing our knowledge.

[Riskypete]

Disclosure first: I’m part of the team behind Sentralis, a cryptocurrency portfolio risk and scenario analysis solution, which produced this analysis. Nobody at dYdX Trading, the dYdX Foundation, the Treasury SubDAO or kpk asked or paid for it, and none of it is advice. It takes no position on any live proposal or vote. In July I posted a short version of these numbers in the June update thread and promised a full write-up; this is it, later than intended and re-based to the July report and the H1 update above.

Everything below is built from public data: the July 2026 report’s position table, on-chain balances, delegations and staking parameters read on August 17, and the governance record (data basis and limitations at the end). If anything in the data basis is wrong, please say so and it will be corrected.

TL;DR:

1. The July report’s $16.04M book comes to about $14.85M at August 17 prices. Same positions, same units; the whole difference is DYDX repricing from the report’s $0.1137 mark to ~$0.1006.
2. The book changed shape in July, and mostly in the direction these numbers favor. The $3.5M USDY deployment took the own-token share from 77% of the June book to 64% of the July one. Both sides of that trade are priced in §1 and §3.
3. Market depth under the DYDX position collapsed while that was happening. The venue-limited daily volume we track fell from ~23M to ~5M DYDX over five weeks, and all-venue aggregates show a similar decline. The staked 90.0M-token position now stands near 18 times daily venue volume (about 4 times in mid-July). After the chain’s 21-day unbonding, a modeled full market exit runs ~260 days under normal assumptions and multiples of that in crisis; §3 has the range and what shrinks on deeper volume figures (the day-counts) and what does not (the 21 days).
4. The modeled 1-in-20 year is −52% to −58% (−$7.7M to −$8.7M) depending on model choice, narrower than the −59% to −67% band I posted for the June book: the USDY share does that work. The trailing-year bootstrap still puts the median year at −49%, and a >20% drawdown occurs in essentially every simulated path under both models.
5. Cash convertible within a week fell to ~$2.3M, from ~$4.7M in June: $2.4M of USDC became USDY, which is redeemable at NAV through Ondo for eligible holders but is not a 7-day order-book exit at this size on our numbers. The two quantities I suggested tracking moved in opposite directions.
6. Two results cut the other way: replaying the Oct-2025→Jul-2026 bear on today’s book, the USDY position gains 5.7% while DYDX loses 76%, which is the diversification doing exactly what it was bought for; and the FTX-collapse replay still marks this book up ~9%.

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Snapshot: 2026-08-17 prices; position units from the July 2026 report (July-31 basis); module balances, delegations and staking parameters read via chain REST on August 17. Covered value: >99.9% of the report’s stated total ($52 of ETH/OSMO dust excluded).

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Which treasury this is about

Pool	Read on 2026-08-17
Treasury SubDAO book (this analysis)	90.04M DYDX staked + 3.07M USDY + $2.30M USDC; $16.04M at the report’s July-31 marks, $14.85M at August-17 prices
Buyback Account (SubDAO-controlled, segregated)	19.97M DYDX staked across 21 validators + $0.20M USDC pending
Community treasury module (on-chain, spent by governance vote)	77.25M DYDX (~$7.77M); the community vester finished draining into it and now sits empty
Insurance fund (separate module; not treasury)	$7.81M USDC

The analysis runs the reported book (Book A) as primary and the combined SubDAO-controlled view (Book A′ = A + Buyback Account) where the buyback question makes it relevant.

1. Repricing and the July restructuring

Report units, repriced at August 17:

Position	Units	Report (Jul 31)	Aug 17
DYDX, staked across ~28 validators	90,041,643	$10.24M	$9.05M
Ondo USDY (Ethereum)	3,067,064	$3.50M	$3.50M
USDC (dYdX-chain + Ethereum wallets, Morpho, unclaimed rewards)	2,300,246	$2.30M	$2.30M
Total		$16.04M	$14.85M

Two things happened to this book in July. It got smaller, mostly from the DYDX decline (−23.7% on the month, another −11% since the report’s mark). And it got materially less concentrated: the $3.5M USDY deployment under the #372 mandate moved the composition from 77% DYDX / 23% stablecoins at the June report’s marks to 64% / 22% / 14% at the July report’s, which is 61% DYDX at today’s prices. The DYDX token count itself rose, from 88.10M to 90.04M, on buyback inflows (§4).

2. Simulations

Two models, 25,000 one-year paths each, same seed. Zero-drift GBM answers “what does this volatility structure do with no view on direction”; the empirical bootstrap resamples the trailing 365 days and answers “what if next year statistically resembles the last one,” which for DYDX makes it the more negative model by design.

	Model-based (GBM, zero drift)	Empirical bootstrap (trailing year)
Modeled 1-in-20 year	−51.8% (−$7.7M)	−58.5% (−$8.7M)
Expected shortfall at the same confidence	−55.7%	−59.7%
Median simulated year	≈+1%	−49.3%
Median worst intra-year drawdown	53%	57%
Paths with a >20% drawdown	~100%	~100%

In July I posted −59% to −67% for the June book. The band moved to −52% to −58% for the same 1-in-20 measure, and the difference is composition, not calmer markets: the DYDX that drives every tail is a smaller share of the book. On the combined SubDAO-controlled view (Book A′, $17.06M, 64.8% DYDX) the band widens back to −55% to −62%.

Two replays bracket the simulations. The realized Oct-2025→Jul-2026 bear applied to today’s composition comes to −45% (−$6.7M), with DYDX at −76% and the USDY position up 5.7% over the same window on real price data: that is the decorrelation the July deployment was buying, visible in a replayed drawdown. The FTX-collapse window still marks the book up about 9% (DYDX rallied as trading moved to decentralized venues; USDY did not exist in 2022 and is held flat, so treat it as order-of-magnitude).

3. Liquidity

The staked DYDX sits behind the chain’s 21-day unbonding (unbonding_time read on-chain; some help pages still say 30 days). What changed since July is the market under it. The venue-limited order-book volume we track averaged ~22.9M DYDX/day (~$2.8M) in mid-July and ~5.0M/day (~$0.5M) now; all-venue aggregates run several times deeper but show the same ~5× decline over the period. Against the narrow basis, the position went from roughly 4 days of all trading to roughly 18.

Modeled as fixed participation in daily volume, on the narrow basis:

	Normal regime (10% participation)	Crisis regime (5% participation, quarter of volume usable)
DYDX full exit, incl. 21-day unbonding	~260 days	~4 years
Convertible to cash within 7 days	the USDC (~$2.3M)	the USDC (~$2.3M)

On deeper volume figures the market-exit days shrink proportionally; the 21 days do not, and neither does the direction of the volume trend. The same arithmetic on the community treasury module (77.25M DYDX, unstaked): ~205 days normal, ~1,230 crisis. As in June, order books are not the only path: OTC blocks exist at treasury scale, the USDY is redeemable at NAV through Ondo for eligible holders rather than sold on-market (our 52-day/310-day order-book figures for it overstate the practical constraint for exactly that reason), and nothing in the SubDAO’s obligations forces an exit on any clock. The day-counts price what a full conversion would cost if governance ever wanted one.

Two single-point scenarios for the positions that concentrate infrastructure: a staking freeze on the book’s staked DYDX (temporary freeze, 80% recovery, 20% haircut on the affected portion; parameter choices, not probabilities) produces an estimated loss of $3.3M (22%); the same parameterization on the Ondo position produces $1.3M (8.5%). The USDY deployment traded market concentration for a new single-issuer exposure; both sides of that trade are now on the table. In fairness, the staking spread stays clean: ~28 validators, the largest near 6.9%.

4. Buybacks

Under #313’s split (75% of net protocol fees to DYDX purchases, 15% to stakers, 5% to this treasury’s stablecoins, 5% to MegaVault), July bought 895,295 DYDX for $111,626 at an average $0.1247, open-market only. Cumulative since April 2025: ~22.3M DYDX for ~$6.7M, a blended ~$0.30 per token against today’s ~$0.10.

Where those tokens sit takes one reconciliation, because the monthly report and the chain answer it differently. The H1 update puts buyback-sourced staked DYDX at 22.2M by end-June. On-chain, the segregated Buyback Account holds 19.97M staked (unchanged between our July 16 and August 17 reads), while the reported book’s own DYDX count rose 88.10M → 90.04M during July against only 0.90M of July purchases. The reading that fits both: bought-back DYDX ends up staked partly in the segregated account and partly inside the reported book, with transfers landing periodically rather than monthly. That split is our inference from the report plus chain data, not a kpk statement; if kpk states the mechanics differently, this section updates.

The direction is not in question, only the address: every buyback dollar becomes staked DYDX under the same 21-day gate, ~10.7M tokens a year at July’s pace. There is a case for the program and it deserves equal weight: the DAO chose it at 59% approval, and accumulation at $0.125 is cheap against the $0.30 blended history if the protocol’s fee base recovers. What the July numbers add is that the stablecoin side of the split (5%) received ~$7.4k while the buyback side converted $112k of fee revenue into the book’s least liquid asset, over the same weeks its market depth was collapsing.

5. Funding

July’s buyback spend implies net protocol fees of about $149k for the month, ~$1.8M annualized, down from ~$256k/month implied in June. No fee holiday was active in July (the series ended with #389’s rejection), so this decline is volume, not fee policy; August’s #393 then wound down fifteen low-volume markets. The treasury’s own staking income was $10.1k for July (1.15% APY on the staked position).

The structure carries over from the June analysis: the treasury is denominated mostly in the token of the protocol whose fees fund it, and the mechanism recycling those fees buys more of the same token. The USDY deployment is the first material weight on the other side of that structure. None of this is a solvency claim.

6. Consolidated view

1. The simulated bad year is still the big number: −$7.7M to −$8.7M on the reported book, −$9.4M to −$10.6M on the combined view. The replayed 2025-26 bear (−$6.7M) sits just below the band.
2. Liquidity, not composition, deteriorated this period: week-scale cash fell from ~$4.7M to ~$2.3M by conversion into USDY, and the DYDX exit runway roughly quadrupled as market volume thinned. Whether USDY’s NAV-redemption path substitutes for the order book at need is now a material operational question, and one kpk can answer better than an outside model.
3. The counterweights are real and one of them is new: the bear replay shows the USDY position appreciating through DYDX’s −76%, the validator spread stays clean, an FTX-style CEX crisis was historically good for this book, and no obligation forces any exit on any clock.

None of this says the current structure is wrong. Token holders chose the buyback bet deliberately, and the July restructuring spent $3.5M making the book harder to break. The two quantities worth tracking on a standing basis are unchanged from my June-thread reply, with updated readings: the own-token share of SubDAO-controlled assets (64.8% today, falling on the USDY move, rising ~10.7M tokens/year under the current split) and the share of the book convertible within a week ($2.3M today, down on the same move).

Method & limitations

• Every headline figure is a model output under stated parameters (participation rates, regime haircuts, freeze/recovery assumptions, covariance windows). Different defensible choices move results materially; treat them as orders of magnitude.
• Position units are the July report’s; prices are August-17 daily data; on-chain reads (balances, delegations, unbonding_time) are August 17. Coverage >99.9% of the report’s stated total. Report totals are compared as stated; we do not re-derive its internal marks.
• Simulations: 25,000 paths, one-year horizon, seeded and reproducible; zero-drift GBM plus an empirical bootstrap of the trailing 365 days, which inherits that year’s direction by design. USDY enters with its real price history (near-zero volatility) and zero expected return, so its ~4% yield is not credited in the simulations.
• Liquidity model: fixed participation in daily order-book volume, venue-limited basis (~5.0M DYDX/day 30-day average at the read date), with the proportional adjustment for deeper bases stated in §3. It ignores OTC and ignores Ondo’s NAV redemption path for USDY; both would shorten realistic exits. At ~18× daily volume, slippage estimates are unreliable extrapolations, so we publish day-counts and omit slippage dollars.
• The staking-freeze and Ondo-freeze scenarios are parameter choices; no probability estimate and no claim about either system’s actual security is implied.
• The FTX replay approximates 39% of the book (USDY pre-dates its own history, USDC held flat) and is order-of-magnitude. The bear replay uses full window data for all three assets.
• The buyback staking split (19.97M segregated + ~2.2M in-book) is our reconciliation of the H1 report against on-chain delegations, stated as inference in §4; corrections welcome and will be incorporated.
• Nothing here is investment advice, and we take no position on any proposal or vote.

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