Presently the voting power is highly concentrated among 4 validators, such that a single validator can halt the chain and top 3 can control governance.
Even though this is still the Alpha stage and the is a large inflow of tokens via the bridge, we’d like to propose a programmatic and objective approach to delegating large chunks of tokens (such as from a treasury).
This could be based on a similar approach as the e-Money Treasury Delegations, with the resulting distributions observable here.
The algorithm is explained here and based on these parameters:
- The median commission for all validators.
- The current commission level for the validator.
- The current self delegation for the validator.
- The current community delegation for the validator.
Adopting such a mechanism would have numerous advantages:
- It increases the security and availability of the chain.
- It gives more validators the opportunity to create blocks, such that block productions times will be more predictable.
- More eyeballs on governance proposals due to less concentration in VP.
We can all agree that the current situation is a little worrisome, but the foundation made it clear from the very start that they would not make delegations themselves and I don’t see them changing their minds about it
How i can sell dydx token after migration??? Why i canot sell dydx ???
it seems like the first avenue in cosmos where you can trade dYdX tokens itself is on Shade Protocol.
The current state of affairs on is a great illustration of how CometBFT consensus works: After 66%+ VP commits, the block is finalised. So all validators outside the top 4 are missing a lot of blocks now:
Hey, @validator_net ! Thanks for this proposal and your involvement. We share your concerns regarding the current stake concentration and the potential for top validators to halt the chain. The primary objective of the Alpha Mainnet is to ensure the stability and security of the chain, and it’s imperative for the entire community to prioritize this. The fact that validators outside the top 4 are generating fewer blocks could potentially lead to significant adverse consequences, especially if there is some problem with Figment (or someone other who has a similar stake concentration), then the network will halt.
We are in full support of the idea of delegations from the treasury. This strategy holds the promise of not only stabilizing the current situation but also contributing to the overall security of the network. This is a widely adopted practice across various ecosystems and serves as a crucial measure against centralization. It’s important to tell users about the drawbacks of centralization and emphasize its detrimental effects.
Your proposal aligns seamlessly with our collective dedication to the well-being of the dYdX network.
I’m more worried about the lack of care from @dYdX_Ops_subDAO by pushing for trading to go live now with the chain not only having this concentrated VP, which is bad, but having almost 3 times as much DYDX circulating on the chain vs whats staked.
Chain is definitely NOT secured and don’t see why the rush to move to Beta phase.
Voting power concentration is is a highly valid concern, and i’d encourage you all to join the discourse here Request for Comment - Governance Improvement Grants - #16 by mgg as we discuss some potential improvements.
My personal take is that VP concentration is a growing pain, and something that will diminish over time given the progressive decentralization we have seen in the protocol, both by plan, and reinforced by the community. I think we will see this concern go away with increasing initiatives in the realm of monitoring and incentives; something that is being developed in the most recent DGP batch (Grants October '23 Update).
Please note that the dYdX Operations subDAO is not involved in the governance decision to transition to the Beta stage! This is solely a dYdX Community decision.
The Operations subDAO is not pushing any specific narrative. The potential transition from Alpha to Beta Stage rests solely with the dYdX governance community, independent of the Operations subDAO’s influence.
Nonetheless, despite the current suboptimal bridged-to-staking ratio, we are of the opinion that permitting trading in a limited capacity, specifically allowing trading activity without any trading rewards, could foster greater diversity in stake to validators within the network. The dYdX Operations subDAO remains uninvolved in governance decisions and will abstain from participating in the dYdX governance process.