dYdX Grants Program - v1.5 Extension


  • We propose extending DGP v1.5 up to an additional six months
  • Extension will focus on infrastructure, MEV, validators, and community initiatives
  • DGP will be restructured to two funding buckets and a separate operations contributor
  • Changes will be made to the Trustees and Enforcer of the dYdX Grants Trust

Proposal Timeline
07/27 - Forum Post
08/03 - AMA Call
08/09 - Deadline for contributor submissions
08/13 - Snapshot proposal


The dYdX Grants Program (“DGP”) was launched January 10th, 2022 for an initial six month term, dubbed “v1.0”. At the end of v1.0, the program was renewed for what has now been 12 months under a revised scope, which we’ve called “v1.5”. DGP v1.5 applied the lessons learned from a broader funding approach in v1.0 to narrow funding targets that maximized for longer lasting impact on dYdX. The current term for the DGP v1.5 will expire on August 15th, 2023.

Throughout its 18 months of operations, the DGP has approved a total of 120 grants with over $3.7 million in funding. During this period, the dYdX protocol has evolved dramatically, with priorities and targets changing rapidly in light of the dYdX v4 development. Although it’s not easy to fund grants for a protocol that is constantly evolving, we’re incredibly excited by the progress the DGP has made — particularly over the last six months — towards funding grants that position dYdX v4 to succeed. To see our progress, check out some of the projects below:

  • Developing the CCTP bridge to seamlessly onboard existing Ethereum based users to dYdX v4.
  • Supporting a Noble-to-dYdX relayer service to enable native USDC integration to dYdX v4, the collateral asset used for all trading.
  • Deploying a dYdX Indexer service on testnet to support data gathering and the future implementation of a mainnet Indexer, a core piece of the dYdX v4 protocol.
  • Building a dashboard that measures and analyzes MEV behavior to lay the foundation for future mitigation strategies, among the top priorities for dYdX v4.
  • Researching cross-chain and validator MEV strategies on a future dYdX chain to help us define areas of improvement.
  • Supporting development efforts of CosmosSDK VoteExtensions, a critical piece of infrastructure that will support price oracles and MEV mitigation on dYdX v4.
  • Launching dYdX testnet services to onboard contributors and provide an improved user experience.

DGP v1.5 Extension

The DGP will be completing its third six-month term on August 15th 2023 with over $2M remaining in unallocated funding. Originally, our goal was to transition to a new version - DGP v2.0 - at the end of our current v1.5 term, aligning with the launch of dYdX v4. We expect v4 to be a catalyst for a whole new set of productive grants, with contributors building directly into the protocol and adding new tools to the product. The open nature of v4 is an opportunity to redefine the dYdX contributor experience, and we have every intention of scaling the program to match this paradigm shift.

However, with the open-sourcing of the dYdX v4 protocol expected for Q4 this year, we feel that DGP v2.0 should be delayed until there is a full picture of what v4 architecture is and how contributors can fit in. Since v4 is not live yet, the areas of development that contributors can play a role in remain moving targets, and it seems premature to scale up the program. Instead, we’d like to propose a six month extension for the DGP, and leverage the remaining funds in DGP v1.5 to continue funding immediate priorities that will help with the launch and potential transition to v4. We are in a critical moment for dYdX, and it’s important that the protocol is able to fund and support infrastructure tied to a successful launch.

Although there isn’t full visibility into longer term funding targets, there are areas of focus today that can deliver a large impact to the protocol. We have identified several high value areas to help with the potential transition to v4. Below, we highlight what we think should be the DGP’s funding priorities during an extension:

Protocol Infrastructure

Ahead of v4, the DGP has played an important role funding critical projects needed to support the launch, including the Indexer, CCTP development, and relayers (see above). We expect to continue funding protocol infrastructure that improves the success of v4. Projects in this category include:

  • Client deployment support (e.g. iOS, Android, Programmatic)
  • Cosmos SDK and CometBFT Development
  • Full node and validator infrastructure
  • API and additional indexing services

MEV Research and Mitigation

MEV research and mitigation strategies remain among our top priorities heading into v4. The in-memory orderbook state will introduce opportunities for MEV on behalf of validators, which could significantly impact the trading experience. We are working closely with Skip and Chorus One to cover all areas of research, and will continue to fund areas of improvement to mitigate its negative impact. Additional projects include:

  • Improving data gathering and analysis for MEV measurement
  • Researching new areas of mitigation (e.g. Threshold Encryption, FHE, TEEs)
  • Supporting development efforts (e.g. VoteExtensions, Threshold Encryption)

Validator/Staking Tools and Resources

The launch of v4 will also introduce two new roles to dYdX: Validators and Stakers. Though existing Cosmos infrastructure exists, we intend to fund dYdX-specific tools and resources to improve the experience for all protocol participants. Projects in this category include:

  • Validator monitoring tools
  • Staking resources and guides
  • Delegated voting power strategies (e.g. Endorsed Delegates)

Beyond these targets, we expect more funding needs to emerge in the next few months as more information on the infrastructure and needs of v4 appear. As an example, the DGP funded several grants that have played an important role in supporting the launch of the v4 testnet. Grants like the Indexer, the CCTP bridge, and relayer services have been critical, and their funding needs only became known as things progressed with development. As we get closer to v4 launch, we expect new funding needs and dependencies to emerge in a time sensitive way. It’s important the community is able to commit funding efficiently to support the launch.

Because there is a strong need to fund initiatives going into v4, but also a lack of perfect clarity on what the scale and specific funding areas are, we are proposing to extend the program up to six months based on funding availability and protocol developments. The goal of this extension is to carry us through the prospective migration and into v4, where we can begin to assess new priorities and the future role of the DGP.

As part of this extension, we also suggest revising the structure, with the goal of introducing more distributed ownership and decision making into the DGP. We believe that this extension is an ideal time to trial a new structure that includes more contributors and controls ahead of a larger scale DGP v2.0. A small, but important, change in the structure will push the DGP in the right direction while maintaining efficiency in this critical period.

Below, we outline a formal proposal for extending the program.

DGP v1.5 Extension Proposal


We propose the DGP is extended up to an additional six months based on funding availability. At the time of writing, DGP v1.5 has ~$2M ($1.8M DYDX and $277k USDC) in unallocated funding. If the funding is used up before the six months, we can reassess the protocol state and collectively decide if a v2.0 program can be launched.


We’ve received a lot of feedback over the last few months on the DGP’s structure. In particular, there’s one piece of feedback that kept coming up — integrating other community members to be part of the DGP. We heard all of that feedback, and as part of this extension, we’re introducing a new process to allow additional contributors to participate in the DGP.

We think it’s important that as the protocol opens up and grows its contributor set with v4, so should the DGP. We also view this as a measure of adding more controls to the DGP’s processes. As the program increases in scale, it’s important that more checks are in place to hold contributors accountable. Below are the new roles and responsibilities we propose be added to the DGP to welcome new faces to the program.

1. Grantor

Responsible for drafting RFPs, screening applications, recommending grants for approval, and managing approved grants. Grantors will be assigned to specific categories of applications based on their expertise. The idea here is that contributors with different skill sets will be better suited to draft RFPs and assess relevant applications.

  • Drafting RFPs
  • Screening, conducting diligence, interviewing, and negotiating with applicants in their category
  • Submitting grants for approval
  • Assessing recommendations from other Grantors
  • Engaging and monitoring the progress of approved grants

We introduce two funding buckets in this extension: Community Initiatives and Strategic Initiatives. Funding buckets will be managed by grantors to focus efforts on specific objectives. Each funding bucket will be allocated a set amount of funding by the Trustees based on the expected impact and objectives. The success of these buckets will be measured based on individual metrics and assessments relevant to the grants approved, some of which may mirror previous measurements.

a. Community Initiatives

Building on the early success of our Community Cauldron program, this bucket will focus on projects that build the dYdX ecosystem, grow the brand, and onboard new protocol contributors.

Funding targets:

  • Events and workshops
  • Promotional and educational content
  • Tooling and technical resources
  • Analytics


  • Onboarding and incentivizing active contributors to the ecosystem
  • Fostering community engagement
  • Promoting the dYdX brand and ecosystem
  • Building useful tools and resources for protocol participants

Funding Allocation: 10% (~$200,000)

b. Strategic Initiatives

This bucket will focus on larger scale projects that contribute to the development, growth, and improvement of the dYdX protocol. We will build on the demonstrated success in partnerships with professional contributors to deliver services and development to dYdX.

Funding targets:

  • Protocol research
  • Protocol development and technical contributions
  • Infrastructure and architecture support
  • Protocol integrations


  • Supporting the launch and maintenance of dYdX v4
  • Enabling the development and integration of new features
  • Onboarding professional service providers as contributors to the protocol
  • Researching new areas of improvement and development

Funding Allocation: 90% (~$1,800,000)

Initially, we expect three grantors to participate in the new structure - two with the Community Initiatives, and one for the Strategic Initiatives. We believe that adding two more contributors to the grants process accomplishes the goal of openness without damaging the program’s effectiveness.

2. Operator

Responsible for payments, financial reporting, and transparency updates.

  • Financial reporting and tracking (e.g. balances, invoices)
  • Initiating payment batches to the Multi-sig on a scheduled basis
  • Updating all transparency dashboards
  • Publishing monthly reports and updates

3. Trustees

We also propose slightly adjusting the role of our Trustees to account for new contributors and changes to the structure. The Trustees will be responsible for:

  • Assessing and approving grants submitted by the Grantors
  • Deciding on and maintaining funding allocations between each bucket
  • Approving transactions submitted by the Operator
  • Holding each contributor accountable to their responsibilities

Given the added responsibilities, Trustees will need to take a more active role in the DGP. Most importantly, the Trustees will need to make sure funding is distributed efficiently across each bucket to maximize the impact from grants. That means weighing the submissions from each bucket against each other to make sure funding is being allocated effectively within the agreed allocations.

How is this different from the current version?

In previous versions, the DGP has operated with a Grants lead in charge of all Grantor and Operator responsibilities. The Trustees were responsible for approving all grant recommendations and holding the lead accountable. In other words, the DGP was maintained by one contributor while the Trustees managed approvals and payments.

In this new version, the DGP is being split across different roles. In doing so, more contributors can participate in running the program and additional controls can be introduced to improve processes.


Here is a rough outline of how we imagine the revised Grants program operating across all contributors


We propose the following assignments and additions to the DGP using the updated structure:


  • Community Initiatives

    • TBD
    • TBD*
  • The second Grantor will be appointed by the new set of Trustees once the extension is launched. The Trustees will run a new selection process.

  • Strategic Initiatives

    • Reverie


  • TBD

As part of this proposal, we invite community members and interested parties to express their interest in joining the DGP as a Grantor for Community Initiatives and the Operator role. The existing Trustees will collectively review all interested members and select their top choices as part of the proposal.

We encourage any interested community members to include the following information in their outreach on this thread:

  • Background
  • What role are you interested in?
  • Why would you like to contribute to the DGP?
  • What should the DGP prioritize as part of this extension?

How will new members be selected?

Existing Trustees will assess all applications and put forward a recommendation for new members of the DGP as part of the proposal.

Legal Amendments to the Trust


We propose replacing Reverie from the Enforcer role. Reverie was originally assigned to be Enforcer as part of our role in establishing and guiding the dYdX Grants Trust. Instead, it makes more sense for Reverie to serve as a contributor to the Trust. The Trust would now benefit from an individual or entity not involved in the day to day taking on the Enforcer responsibility.

As a reminder, the Enforcer is responsible for holding Trustees accountable and communicating activity with the community. The Enforcer reviews activity performed by the Trustees to make sure the purposes of the Trust are being carried out.


  • Reverie Reserves, LLC


  • TBD


A few of our existing Trustees will be stepping down in an effort to invite new members of the community and ecosystem to participate in the DGP. Based on the applications received, the final proposal may replace more or less than what was originally outlined. At this time, we propose making the following changes to the Trustees of the dYdX Grants Trust:


  • GFX Labs, Inc.
  • Scalar Capital Management, LLC
  • Alexios Valonasis


  • TBD
  • TBD
  • TBD

As part of this proposal, we invite community members to express their interest in serving as either Enforcer or Trustee on the dYdX Grants Trust. The existing Trustees will collectively review all interested members and select their top choice.

We encourage any interested community members to include the following information in their outreach:

  • What’s your background? What previous work have you done?
  • What role are you interested in?
  • Why are you an ideal fit for the role?
  • What should the DGP prioritize as part of this extension?


At the time of writing, the DGP has over $2,000,000 in funding available. Below, we outline a budget for operating the DGP using the existing funding available.

Grantor (Strategic Initiatives) $35,000 / month
Grantor (Community Initiatives) (2) $6,000 / month ($3,000 each)
Operator $2,000 / month
Trust Members
Lead Trustee $2,500 / month
Other Trustees (4) $4,000 / month ($1,000 each)
Enforcer $1,500 / month
Total $51,000 / month
Operating Expenses
Legal $20,000
Maintenance / Infrastructure $10,000
Total Budget (6 months) $336,000

A note on the compensation difference between the two buckets. The Strategic Initiatives bucket will encompass roughly 90% of the funding budget. We expect the majority of long term impact to be produced from this bucket. Historically, these types of grants have required significantly more time and resources to produce. They include long-term commitments with professional service providers, requiring more complex structures and management to maximize the value created for the dYdX protocol. Community Initiatives on the other hand are typically issued with a default structure and little back and forth. We believe in the value of both buckets. They can both generate impact to dYdX in their own ways. The compensation reflects the significant difference in workload and commitment between the two.


We propose extending the DGP v1.5 up to an additional six months using the remaining $2M funding available. As part of this extension, the DGP will be restructured to onboard two more contributors to the grant management process and one member to manage operations. Finally, we also propose making changes to the Trustees and Enforcer, opening up these roles to new community members.

We look forward to everyone’s thoughts and comments on this proposal. With the current term expiring on August 15th, we aim to put the proposal up by August 13th.


While the recent initiatives to expand the dYdX Grants Programme (DGP) are laudable, it’s evident that we must aim even higher to unlock its full potential.

Being proponents of decentralisation and autonomy, our collective aspiration should be to shape the DGP into an efficient model of excellence capable of acting as a blueprint for future programmes within the dYdX ecosystem.

At the heart of our vision is enforcing stringent accountability among grantors. We suggest creating a comprehensive platform designed to enhance transparency, streamline monitoring, and foster continuous performance improvement. It’s high time we build a DGP that truly embodies the principles of decentralisation, autonomy, and unrelenting accountability.

Here are some points that we feel must be reconsidered:


We propose establishing an application procedure via an official dYdX governance/grants platform. This approach would ensure all applications and their corresponding outcomes are publicly accessible, fostering an environment of transparency and accountability. To further enhance accountability, we recommend implementing a maximum seven-day period for decision-making on applications.

Moreover, incorporating community voting on applications and enabling feedback on each application’s perceived value through polling can be invaluable. Such an approach would harness our community’s collective intelligence for better cost assessment—addressing a crucial concern with the current program.

Given the time it may take to build such a platform, we suggest initially using Discourse to facilitate this process. A prototype of how this might look and function can be found here.


All interactions between grantees and grantors should be made public to bolster transparency, unless the grantee specifically requests to keep it private. This ensures timely responses, promotes professionalism and efficiency in their dealings, and gives the community a transparent evaluation of the grantors’ conduct. These measures would be essential for electors when considering future candidates for the DGP, underlining the vital role of accountability. We suggest using Discourse for these communications, below the grantee’s applications, as mentioned above, until an in-house solution is available.

Funding Split

The current proposal for a 10/90 funding split between strategic and community initiatives doesn’t sufficiently account for the high costs commonly associated with technical development, particularly in the domains of tooling and analytics. For example, based on our experience, the creation of an advanced trading journal accommodating the community’s requests for v4 could demand up to $150k in funding, substantially depleting the community bucket. Once we incorporate other essential analytics tools into the equation, the current funding provision appears starkly inadequate. While Reverie has demonstrated competence, there may be a gap in appreciating the true financial demands of these complex tooling projects. In response to this concern, we propose a community poll to collectively determine a more suitable funding split that genuinely aligns with the financial needs of these projects. The poll could offer options like 10/90, 20/80, 30/70 or 40/60, facilitating a democratic approach to funding allocation. Given the financial realities we’ve outlined, we’re inclined to recommend a 30/70 split as a more practical and sustainable solution.


We recognise Reverie’s dedication and achievements, but we firmly believe that a decentralised approach is necessary for the DGP’s continued success. No matter how competent, a system dependent on a single entity inherently lacks diverse perspectives and may inadvertently favour certain biases. This approach is inconsistent with the decentralised ethos that should define our ecosystem.

It’s critical to realise that the current model, relying on Reverie as the sole decision-maker, presents a highly concentrated structure prone to various risks, including bias, misjudgment, and single points of failure. Decentralisation minimises these risks by pooling diverse perspectives, facilitating shared responsibility, and promoting accountability and transparency.

As a more pragmatic and balanced approach, we propose the appointment of three grantors for the Community Bucket and two for the Strategic Initiatives Bucket. Under this framework, every grant application would necessitate majority approval from the respective grantors. This arrangement would enhance the decision-making process, drawing on the grantors’ collective expertise while embedding a system of checks and balances to ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability. The shift to a decentralised model is not just desirable; it’s an essential evolution that aligns with our community’s values and the future we envision for the DGP.


The role of an Operator, as outlined in the proposal, includes responsibilities that could potentially be automated, such as initiating payment batches, updating transparency dashboards, and publishing monthly reports. However, we suggest a more streamlined approach where grantors manage grantees through the process, casting votes upon project completion. Automated payments could be triggered by successful completion votes, enhancing process efficiency and eliminating the need for manual payment processing. With these adaptations, we question the necessity of the Operator role. If these duties can be effectively managed through automation and active grantor involvement, it may render the Operator role redundant, thereby streamlining the grants process and reducing overhead costs.


As we propose expanding the grantor base to five, it’s worth questioning the need for separate trustee approval. If our larger, more diverse set of grantors perform effectively, they could potentially assume the responsibilities of trustees. This approach better aligns with our decentralised model and could simplify the governance process.


Under our decentralised approach, we propose the management of the Strategic Initiatives Bucket be assigned to two grantors, each receiving a monthly compensation of $15,000. This ensures a balanced workload, promotes diverse decision-making, and maintains cost efficiency.

Regarding the Community Initiatives Bucket, we recommend allocating $7,000 monthly to our three proposed grantors. The elevated compensation accounts for their extended responsibilities as they’re expected to fulfil the roles of trustees and possibly part of the Operator’s duties, such as managing grantees throughout the process.


Elections should be a process that reflects the sentiments and needs of the entire community. Therefore, the automatic reconsideration of Alexios’ role should not be taken for granted. Instead, all interested parties should be given an equal opportunity to apply for all three positions within the Community Initiatives Bucket. The most suitable candidates should then be chosen through a voting process conducted by the endorsed delegates. This open and democratic approach should also be applied when selecting the additional grantor for the Strategic Initiatives Bucket. Ensuring that the individuals in these pivotal roles are genuinely representative of and accountable to the community they serve is critical.

Summary and Future Prospects

Our proposed modifications to the dYdX Grants Programme v1.5 are rooted in the ethos of decentralisation and our community’s collective intelligence. A more transparent, accountable, and decentralised model for grants management would significantly enhance the efficiency and impact of the DGP.

The key points of our proposal include:

  • Establishing a publicly accessible application procedure to enhance transparency.
  • Making all grantee-grantor communications public for accountability.
  • Reconsidering the funding split to better align with the financial demands of projects.
  • Expanding the number of grantors and decentralising decision-making.
  • Automating the role of the Operator and reassigning trustee responsibilities to grantors.
  • Revising grantor compensation to reflect their workload and responsibilities.
  • Instituting an open election process for grantor positions.

Recognising the potential time constraints and the complexity of these modifications, we propose a gradual implementation process. An initial phase could use existing platforms like Discourse to facilitate application procedures and community engagement. We also offer our willingness to contribute to the product design and development processes if our proposals align with the community’s vision.

In the long term, introducing a mechanism to rotate grantors and a dedicated platform to manage the grants process would solidify the principles of decentralisation, transparency, and accountability in the DGP.

Our suggestions aim to contribute towards a more resilient, inclusive, and efficient DGP. We look forward to seeing how our proposals may shape its evolution and stand ready to support this process.


Thanks @Reverie for putting together the proposal. It’s well-thought-out and future forwarding with feedback from community considered.

The intention of extending v1.5 rather than v2 makes sense since we are still waiting for the whole picture of how V4 is going to look like and be released. The idea of having more involvements from the community into the program is quite promising and something we should craft as we experiment the process.

We have a couple of feedback on details of the proposal as below:

Funding splits

Similarly to @CipherLabs but slightly different one, we think an ideal split would be 20-80 since there will be important toolings and onboarding efforts to be done for the V4 release, but still strategic efforts are more critical to be done, thus 20-80.


$35k / month to the Strategic Initiatives’ Grantor looks too much compared to the compensation the Community Initiatives’ Grantor. If the above splits are to be applied, a little increase (like $1,500) to the Grantor makes sense while the compensation to the Strategic Initiatives’ Grantor would be somewhere around $30k, or less. I think we should look into standard compensations for Grantors from other protocols too as benchmark.

Structural changes

While we believe the direction laid out in the proposal is great, there are too many TBDs to be filled before the current term expires. The election process needs to be discussed and agreed upon, and the actual election itself will take time. We like the idea of having this change as an experiment to further improve the Grants Program V2, but we can start small and focus on important structures to be modified at this point. Open to discuss more on how we design the v1.5 extension structure.


We wouldn’t necessarily consider all the communication should be public; there should be parties who are not comfortable sharing what they are applying for or even the fact that they are working on it. However, we also think the transparency is the key to any grants programs, and more occasional information sharing about approved grants will be great for the community and DAO.

Lastly, though this can be more for the future considerations, can we discuss how the grants are delivered in an efficient way? As some of you may know, there is a controversial forum discussion about canceling a service to Aave in the middle of the term. On the other hand, Retroactive Funding seems to be thriving. We can come up with an interesting way to compensate grantees for their services based on the quality of their services as well as how they communicate with the DAO.

We like to contribute to the better and efficient grants program design as we discuss within the community. Thanks!

Takeshi, Tané


Personal Opinion*

Echoing the thoughts of others above. It’s great to see the proposed changes based on community feedback. This has been a concern for several individuals over previous iterations, so kudos for changing things up and improving the transparency and function of the DGP.

There are a lot of changes despite only being a potential 6-month extension; however, continuing a version of the DGP is vital to fund some of these high-priority initiatives that will be impactful and essential for the ecosystem. In my opinion, over the past 6 months, the DGP has supported some of the most impactful initiatives to date that are material to the function of v4, despite navigating an ever-changing landscape with the potential launch of the v4 dYdX Chain (MEV, CCTP, Relayer, Indexer Service, Vote Extensions, etc.)

A 90:10 split makes sense. This is still an 8x funding increase for event/cauldron-based initiatives.
Priority should be placed on research, infrastructure, MEV, Validator tooling, and resources.

Noting the above responses to the proposal, there’s definitely some merit in creating a democratic approach to elections, comms, etc., and in my opinion, there will be a time for an iteration of a program that consists of this. I don’t believe that time is right now, but I would support an iteration, or additional programs, that structure things differently in the future, post the potential launch of the dYdX Chain.

I don’t think this is a zero-sum game. We’ve seen a number of projects recently funding multiple grants programs, and come to the potential launch of the dYdX chain in Q4 this year, competition should be encouraged, and having several potential grants workstreams should/could be an option.

If Reverie considers and addresses some of the comments above, I would be supportive of the proposal for the DGP to continue over the next 6 months.


I would like to write a lengthy post about the issues with the current grant program, and I will definitely do so. However, this requires a significant amount of time.

Therefore, for now, I will only discuss this specific proposal. I understand that we have limited time to revise the grant program, but I believe it is possible to improve this proposal in order to make the program more decentralized and transparent.

Positive aspects:
I will start by mentioning the positive aspects. The division of the program into strategic and community is a good idea. These directions should be completely independent. I support the departure of Reverie from the position of Enforcer.

And now, about the improvements to the proposal that I see:

  1. It is essential that the Trustees are completely independent, whether from the community or not. It is crucial for Reverie or the Community Grantors not to be involved in their selection process.

  2. Why is a second manager required in the Community Cauldron if only 10% of the funds are allocated to it?
    If this portion requires more work, why is only 10% directed towards it? Furthermore, if this funding is intended for community initiatives, the selection of the manager should be discussed.

  3. The community has expressed dissatisfaction with how initiatives are sponsored, as highlighted by @Ax07 during yesterday’s Town Hall. Who is responsible for these issues? If it is @carlbergman and Reverie, then the community portion of the grants should be completely independent from them.
    However, if the problem lies with Alexios, I believe he should not be included in the list of Grantors. Therefore, I invite @Alexios to participate in this thread to explain to us why there is underfunding.

  4. Considering introducing a second individual as an independent Grantor in the strategic direction would be worthwhile.

  5. Why do we need an Operator if grant payments currently occur monthly? If such payments will continue to occur in the future, an Operator is unnecessary. Who is responsible for such rare monthly payments? The reporting system must be uniform and mandatory for both the Community and Strategic components. Enforcer can handle its publication.

  6. I disagree with the 90/10 split proposal. The community portion of grants requires consistent and regular funding. Projects in the strategic component usually involve longer-term endeavors, sometimes spanning up to 12 months. There are no 100% payments in advance. Therefore, if necessary, an additional proposal can be made regarding further financing for the strategic component.


We have worked with Reverie and the DGP as grantees, and can attest to the professionalism exhibited by Reverie’s overall operations.

Their diligent approach to the evaluating proposals ensures the grantees are positioned to deliver value to the community.
Reverie is also helpful during the execution phase, where they offer guidance and feedback throughout the process.

With the V4 release coming up, the DGP has the potential to serve as an important catalyst, creating dynamic set of contributors dedicated to the growth of the protocol. We’re confident in the significant benefits that the community stands to gain under a continuation of the DGP.


We at Xenophon Labs have had a great experience working with the grants program so far, and we are in agreement with @chaoslabs that the grants program will be valuable to the dYdX community as V4 mainnet approaches. Furthermore, given Reverie’s involvement in the Cosmos ecosystem via the Osmosis Grants Program, I am confident that they will have the best shot at accessing and retaining the high quality domain experts that will be necessary to ensure a smooth launch of dYdX V4.


Kudos to Reverie. Without doubt the best Grants Program in web3! Strong Yes

1 Like

~ Personal thoughts as community member ~

I am in favor of passing this proposal. It’s my view that Reverie has been a good steward of the grants program. I’ve found them to be knowledgeable and sophisticated in their understanding of the dYdX products as well as the crypto ecosystem as a whole. Once grants are funded, Reverie remains engaged and holds high standards for the grants output, as well as guiding coordination between grants recipients and other stakeholders.

Reverie has incorporated some community feedback in this extension proposal which is great. However, my view is that Reverie’s performance has been good enough that even if they proposed extending the current program unmodified for another 6 months I would be supportive of that also. I don’t view additional rebalancing towards the Community Initiatives bucket as necessary, nor changes to compensation.


Thank you @antonio for sharing your thoughts.

Can you explain to the community how an absolutely centralized grants program aligns with your vision of dydx as a protocol striving for decentralization?
Or is the grant program not an area that needs decentralization?

Thank you.

1 Like

The community has clearly stated their issues with the program on many occasions and probably won’t even bother highlighting them here. One could say the majority of the feedback was not included, although I would rather not talk about KPI’s again. Your comment makes me feel the disconnect between community, trading, and foundation with most community concerns going unaddressed. We’re beating a dead horse here, but I can say with almost 100% certainty most community members will be left with a taste of dissatisfaction after your comment.

The majority of the remaining community would beg to differ and have been fighting for the opposite if anything this separates them from “professional grantees” further highlighting the disconnect and overall belief the community is uneducated.


Dear @antonio,

I read your comments on Reverie’s performance with great interest. Your perspective is undoubtedly important, and we all value your insights. However, I confess to feeling somewhat surprised and perplexed by your stance. It is my understanding that the overarching objective of dYdX is to build a truly decentralised trading platform. If so, then an effective DAO is undoubtedly crucial to support this. I am convinced that the dYdX Grants Programme offers a fantastic opportunity to begin crafting this DAO and, in doing so, establish a standard for the rest of the ecosystem.

From where I stand, your satisfaction with Reverie’s management of the DGP seems at odds with my experiences, as well as those reported by other grantees in our community. In my most recent encounter, it took Reverie seven weeks to reach a straightforward conclusion on a retroactive grant and an additional three weeks to arrange payment.

On one occasion, we were paid $500 USDC less than the agreed amount as we were sent DYDX tokens, with no payment notification, instead of USDC. We were later told this was just “the cost of doing business in the space”. I then had to bear that loss to pay the developers for their work out of my own pocket. This experience, along with other inefficiencies I’ve encountered, did not meet my expectations of an optimally run DGP, especially considering the significant compensation involved.

Furthermore, I’ve noticed numerous comments and complaints on the forums regarding delays and inefficiencies in the application process, along with other issues that anyone can view publicly. These comments escalated to the point that the foundation had to intervene, and Carl had to hide his online status from the community—a situation that persists today.

Just a couple of days ago, we had a community member publicly express dissatisfaction during a Town Hall meeting, complaining about how severely underpaid they were, despite their incredible work. Whilst I am grateful for the support we have received and the opportunity to prove our worth, I have personally witnessed founders of other trading journals post public “lol” messages regarding the funding we received in return for the work carried out by us to get the trading journal to its MVP version. I know of one instance where dYdX has now missed serious opportunities, such as promoting the exchange to 4,600 Russian-speaking traders, due to Reverie’s reluctance to fund appropriate amounts to the contributors undertaking this work. I suspect perhaps also due to personality clashes and personal grievances—an issue when you have a single point of control.

These experiences highlight a substantial disconnect between your assessment of Reverie’s performance and the reality the broader community faces. While I won’t dispute that Reverie may produce excellent results with those they selectively engage, this current approach introduces biases and judgments that appear contrary to the ideals of decentralisation and autonomy that I believed we all strive for.

Interestingly, a couple of the positive comments above are from members of the foundation and yourself, none of whom directly work with Reverie as grantees, and Chaos Labs, who, to my understanding, as pointed out publicly by community members, received a significant advance of $300,000 over a year ago for work that has yet to be executed, with no public clarification about this payment and its purpose other than it being a means of “locking them in” for potential future work. Also, Max, the top compensated grantee, who, while performing extremely important and professional work and who I respect and am in no way criticising, would naturally have a favourable view of Reverie.

To clarify, In some aspects, I have had positive experiences also, and I don’t wish to criticise but to enhance the DGP’s functionality and performance. The conundrum is that If we don’t point out the inefficiencies you’re unaware of, and actively find solutions, how can we expect to improve? And regrettably, by making these statements, I might be compromising our chances of receiving the funding we need to build out more projects for dYdX. This is a major reason why most people won’t voice any negative experiences that could be reflected upon to improve the DGP. We hoped to secure funds to develop an advanced v4 analytics dashboard like this prototype we are currently working on and the fully featured v4 trading journal, but I fear that achieving these goals may now be challenging depending on how personally Reverie takes this feedback.

If a centralised organisational structure is what you envision for dYdX, it would be beneficial to make this clear today to prevent community confusion and frustration. If, however, decentralisation and autonomy remain the objectives, I believe my suggestions for the DGP offer a constructive way forward.

Rather than having Reverie oversee all aspects of the DGP—which, given their proposed control over 90% of the funds and Alexios’s semi-control of the rest, appears to be the case—they could manage the clients they choose to work with separately. Concurrently, we could build a new governance platform over the next six months to manage a secondary grants program and other organisational facets, all within a fully decentralised and autonomous framework. This setup would promote the necessary checks and balances, be efficient, cost effective, and encourage accountability.

As demonstrated by the broader industry’s evolution, I am convinced that this council-centric, decentralised approach to governance represents the future. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on my perspective and am eager to collaborate with you to ensure dYdX and its community continue to thrive.

Best Regards,



First of all, I want to thank you for your projects to develop dYdX. I have no doubt that you are a world-class web3 company. At the same time, I would like to clarify few things

Professionalism exhibited by Reverie’s overall operations
I allow myself to doubt the professionalism of Reverie in your specific case. They paid you $300K upfront without any defined scope of work and kept this information hidden from the community, even during the proposal for grants 1.5. After I discovered the on-chain transactions,@carlbergman provided the following explanation.

Have we seen the Service Provider Agreement with Chaos? No, no one has provided it to us since the end of April.

Since then, Chaos has received a research grant of $40k. Okay, we will deduct that from the $300k.

Therefore, my question is, do you plan to return $260k in multisig or show the service provider agreement to the community?

Proof of payments to Chaos Labs:

Grants approved for the Chaos Labs

The screenshots above are from the Dashboard from the official site of DGP

1 Like

I want to acknowledge @CipherLabs and @RealVovochka’s feedback. Albeit not perfect, Reverie has added value to the protocol, and no one else has stepped up and proposed a compelling alternative to the Grants Program to this day.

With this proposal, Reverie will be doing the heavy lifting with strategic initiatives, while two community members will support community initiatives. The trustees, whom I am hoping will be active community members, will have to approve the grants, as well as the payments initiated by the operator. The operator initiates the payments, which again have to be approved by the trustees, and updates the community and relevant dashboards.

Regarding the operator role being redundant, I don’t believe this to be the case. There has to be a clear distinction and ownership of responsibilities within the DGP, and delegating the operator’s tasks to grantors or trustees would not ensure that. The operator will have to deal with duties such as verifying that each outgoing payment corresponds to an invoice and that the invoices received by the Grants Program are compliant (having an invoice number, service description, address, date, amount, etc.). Having an operator means that we can potentially improve payables turnover (paying grantees faster) by initiating more frequent payment runs, as well as providing grantees with a dedicated contact person for any payment-related inquiries or concerns. Other things such as record-keeping, auditing, verifying wallet addresses, or bank accounts (in case we deal with fiat payments), and publishing reports and updates are important tasks that cannot be automated.

I have been interested in joining the Grants Program in the past. Even though I would be open to being a trustee, I believe that having a background in accounting would make me an ideal candidate for the operator role of the DGP v1.5 Extension. I will not tire you with lengthy introductions since I have already introduced myself more than once here and here. To answer the questions posed by Reverie: I want to contribute to the DGP because I believe I can improve the relationship we have with our creditors (grantees), and because I simply like the protocol and want to play a role in its development and growth. With the upcoming v4 mainnet launch, I would like to see funding go towards interactive dashboards that visualize the state of the dYdX chain. I think GMX is doing a fantastic job with their dashboards from which we can take inspiration.


All these tasks can be automated. Imagine a well designed governance platform which contributors (grantees) log into with their wallets, submit applications through, communications occur there, then grantors vote for approval, and finally grantors vote on completion, and everything you mentioned happens instantly and automatically. And then the contributor claims their payment from their governance dashboard just like we currently do with rewards.

Perhaps the fiat banking system part you mentioned won’t work but it would seem a bit backward to be doing that in a Web3 world.


While I’d like to recognize the frustrations and subpar experiences with the current DGP led by Reverie, reported by @CipherLabs, @RealVovochka and various other members and grantees in Discord and Discourse, I agree with @Nascor on how we should approach this proposal that is possibly not perfect, and far from the ideal that the community members hoped for, but the feasible based on the current timeline, and most importantly improved one. Great to see community members come forward and contribute to the DGP!

While we keep having discussions around what the DPG should look like at its v2 stage, this proposal includes the existence of the Trustees which are separated from the Grantor role and the assigned responsibilities to the Trustees are the most requested ones to be addressed according to experiences and feedback from the community members in the past; the observer for the DGP. I think it’s critical for Reverie to keep involved in the DGP as the main Grantor with ample context and some positive feedback while the Trustees and Operator can improve the process, communication and transparency through the v1.5 phase and eventually we as the DAO can experiment a different format or multiple tests toward v2. Even so, if many of the community members object to the idea of having Reverie as a single Grantor, we may need to consider having the second Grantor for Strategic Initiatives, but the next question we should answer is who is qualified to do so. I’m relatively new to the platform, and not quite certain whether we can find one in time for the v1.5 extension term.

Regarding the disconnect between some of the members, entities (not sure how exactly we interpret what Antonio said “as a community member” but I assume dYdX Trading is satisfied with Reverie’s services) and others, I think we may need a dedicated session or something to discuss how the DAO improves the communication, governance process and grow as a mature DAO going forward. However, we better focus on how we settle the DGP v1.5 extension.


We’ve been part of this community for two years and have contributed on multiple fronts while closely observing the frustrations and concerns that arise daily. Thus, we have a deep understanding of the changes needed. While your point about focusing on the v1.5 proposal is valid, it’s essential to address the challenges early to ensure we don’t face the same issues during the v2 proposal.

Typically, proposals are made only two weeks before the vote, leaving little time for necessary adjustments. To avoid this, we believe it’s prudent to discuss and suggest v2 changes now and actively start working towards them. Our team is willing to offer our expertise to help with this undertaking.

In the meantime, and to address v1.5, here are some immediate changes we believe are necessary:

  1. Add another Grantor to the Strategic Bucket for decentralised decision-making.
  2. Add an additional Grantor to the Community Initiatives Bucket to avoid undue influence.
  3. Open all three community bucket positions to all applicants for a fair selection process.
  4. Have Endorsed Delegates assess and vote on candidates, ensuring community involvement.
  5. Manage applications and communications via Discourse for transparency and feedback.
  6. Set a maximum seven-day time frame for deciding on applications.
  7. Ensure grants are paid within seven days of work completion or milestones.
  8. Update funding split to a minimum of 20/80 or potentially 30/70 for fairer distribution.
  9. Have the five grantors assume the trustee roles for efficiency.
  10. Compensate Community Initiatives grantors with an industry-standard amount of $5,000 - $7,000 and Strategic Bucket Grantors with $15,000 each.
1 Like

Hi @tane and @Nascor
I understand that voting on such proposals is merely a formality, and I realize that Reverie will be with us for another 6 months.
Therefore, in my first post, I wrote about the improvements that I would like to see

When analyzing the results of any project at its conclusion, it is necessary to understand what did not work and what can be improved. Reading Reverie’s post and the unquestionable support from Antonio might give the impression that the program works perfectly, but this is far from the truth. I also understand the support from @max-holloway and @chaoslabs , who collectively received 25% of all funds disbursed by the program.
I don’t want to go into detail about all these issues; @antonio is aware of them and if he is satisfied, there is no point in writing about it.

There were some improvements in transparency, dashboard, and other aspects. However, this was partly driven by the activity of the community, which exerted pressure on Reverie.

I won’t delve into Strategic Initiatives; let Reverie stay there and complete its infrastructure grants until V4 starts. The community has no details about selecting grantees in this part - scope of work and others. Everything is done through networking via Reverie. It will take time for someone new to understand this, time we do not have.

But I insist that those constructive changes, which were proposed by me and @CipherLabs , at least be taken into discussion.


Pitching in here from Chorus One.
We have worked with the DGP and Reverie as a grantee, in the context of our research grant on validator-driven MEV. Our comprehensive analysis will be out in the next few days, and we expect that the community will find it valuable.

Throughout the process, we have found Reverie to be responsive and knowledgeable. In the initial stages, this reflected as clearly communicated and results-focused expectations. Later, Reverie became a valuable source of ecosystem contacts and effectively coordinated answers to a variety of practical questions (e.g. concerning the release).

Overall, we share Antonio’s impression that Reverie combines a sophisticated understanding of dYdX products with a high degree of engagement.
We enjoyed working with the team, and take away the impression that the grants program is run in a professional, pragmatic, and results-oriented manner.


I believe that the proposed new structure and funding buckets make sense for a six month runtime. dYdX v4 is a massive undertaking that should see a major shift in funding allocation strategies as far as infrastructure, tooling, and integrations are concerned. It makes sense to extend DGP for a shorter runtime to allow sufficient time to assess the changing needs of the protocol.

Cosmos is a different beast from the Ethereum / L2 ecosystem, and moving forward I feel that it will be important to have contributors that are intimately familiar with Cosmos and Cosmos-specific infrastructure, tooling, and teams. For that reason, I’d like to submit myself for consideration for the open Grantor role. More info on me and my background:


I’ve been involved in the Cosmos Ecosystem since 2020. I was an early community contributor to Osmosis (a decentralized exchange appchain in the Cosmos ecosystem), where I helped provide end-user and developer support for early Osmosis users and integrators. I was a cofounder of the Osmosis Support Lab, a community funded support team for Osmosis, often referenced as one of the most successful community-run support organizations in the Cosmos Ecosystem. Although I have since left the Support Lab, I continue to actively contribute to Osmosis as a writer for its blog, and as a member of the Osmosis Grants Program. I usually write content related to major chain upgrades like this one.

I have also made contributions in the areas of governance, business development, marketing, and strategy advising to other major chains in the ecosystem. Through these experiences I have contacts with most teams in the cosmos ecosystem, and would be able to leverage these contacts to proactively pursue teams that would be a good fit for outstanding RFPs.

I also have a deep understanding of financial markets by virtue of my experience with Osmosis (and as an active degen myself :sweat_smile:). I’ll be able to use this knowledge to identify areas where educational or community engagement resources may be lacking, and help approve grants that will fill those needs.

I’m hopeful that my knowledge of the Cosmos ecosystem and the unique opportunities and challenges that it faces will allow me to help foster grants that quickly address unexpected friction points with the dYdX v4 launch and GTM. I recently wrote a post here in the dYdX forums that should give an indication of my understanding of the ecosystem and my desire to see dYdX v4 flourish! You can find that forum post here: dYdX v4 - A Beginner's Guide to Cosmos

For more information, you can find me on twitter at https://twitter.com/RoboMcGobo

Why would you like to contribute to the DGP?

From the perspective of a Cosmos native, dYdX v4 is one of the most exciting developments in Cosmos history. The influx of activity that dYdX will bring to the ecosystem is unparalleled by any previous launch. I want to see this launch succeed and take an active role in helping grow dYdX and the Cosmos ecosystem together. As a trailblazer in the industry, dYdX v4’s success will inevitably mean a migration of other successful protocols to the appchain model. Fostering a smooth transition and a successful integration for that model with dYdX is, imo, the most important thing that the DGP should be doing as part of this v1.5 extension.

What should the DGP prioritize as part of this extension?

Per the above, the DGP should prioritize Infrastructure / code improvements, tooling, and educational resources that help make the v4 transition secure, seamless, and ultimately successful. Here are just a few examples of things I would like to see:

  1. Validator uptime, monitoring, signing, and alerting tools, similar to Tenderduty or Horcrux
  2. Educational resources on Cosmos, the Cosmos ecosystem, and IBC.
  3. Research papers on topics related to the v4 transition including security bootstrapping models and MEV mitigation strategies / threshold encryption.
  4. On-chain governance tooling
  5. MEV tooling
  6. Privacy tooling (encrypted mempools, shielded actions, etc) and research on whether any of these solutions are practical / desired for dYdX v4
  7. Account abstraction and overall UX improvement / abstraction (a major focus for dYdX contributors that could be aided by the community)
  8. dYdX v4 hackathons and other community events

I hope to help the DGP take an active role in bringing several of these items, and more, to dYdX. Thank you all for your consideration!