We believe it is important at this moment, when there is such a relevant debate about the incentive program, that it can be discussed broadly before approving its continuation. As Dragon Stake, we are going to vote no, although this doesn’t mean we are against @chaoslabs being able to implement them. We believe that a vote that has generated this level of debate should not be held in August and over a weekend, as it is a period that is not optimal in terms of the availability of many token holders. We think it should be canceled, and an attempt should be made to set voting dates that allow for a broader debate, as approving it would close the possibility for changes and discourage further discussion. I think it is important in these matters to review delegations so that they can be aligned with what is being considered.
While your suggestion makes logical sense, it’s unfortunately clear that logic often takes a backseat in these situations. It seems that decisions are driven more by self-interest than by the broader community’s best interests. The reality is that many participants likely vote ‘yes’ without fully understanding the implications, or perhaps this outcome was predetermined behind closed doors before any real discussion took place. This situation only underscores the need for more transparency and genuine debate in such critical matters, but sadly, the current process seems designed to stifle that.
The problem isn’t how the validators are voting, but rather that 60-90% of many of their stakes consist of delegations from the Foundation and Stride (87% of which came from the community treasury). They have no accountability to the community, don’t bother reading the forum, and don’t communicate the reasons behind their choices, etc. It’s absolutely disgusting. Who was this document created for? Good Practices for dYdX Chain Validators and Stakers?
Such actions by the validators cast a shadow on governance in dydx.
I urge the @dYdXFoundation to intervene and convince the validators to adhere to the stated standards or revoke their delegations.
The reason for the problems at dydx isn’t that revenue sharing was enabled, but that community members and token holders have completely lost their sense of ownership.
Something similar with delegations should be done by @stride as well, but I’m not holding my breath. Has anyone seen Stride here after they received 20M tokens from the community treasury?
Wall of shame:
No forum profile while 87% of stake came from Foundation and Stride
This is far from a complete list of the Yes crew validators, but probably the most notable representatives.
First of all, thank you for your comment on our suggestion… We are investors in the project and have been active users for quite some time. It’s important to recognize dYdX’s exceptional role within the DeFi ecosystem and the risks inherent in developing a project like this in such a highly regulated space. Credit is certainly due to the foundation and the providers, including @chaoslabs , who have made it possible. Active governance in a DAO can add tremendous value, and I believe the project currently needs to regain its growth momentum in a highly competitive environment.
The decision regarding the incentive program is pivotal, and for this reason, we believe that taking the time to analyze the results of strategies implemented in recent months is crucial. That said, we are optimistic about the future. I believe there is great potential to further improve the DAO’s governance, and the contributions we’ve seen in the forum, including your own @CipherLabs , provide an excellent starting point. The responsibility of delegation is significant and, in my view, should be considered beyond just the commission, especially in critical moments like these. However, this is a broader issue within DAOs that we should work on raising awareness about.
We are committed to contributing in any way we can, always striving to align with the project’s interests, which ultimately benefits us all
Hey @cryptoplaza,
We appreciate your active engagement and the ongoing debate surrounding the incentive program and the vote to re-launch it. We do not think the vote needs to be cancelled.
While we agree that the timing of the vote could have been better, Chaos Labs has provided a rationale:
“As Season 6 concludes between August 18-28, this proposal is designed to provide traders and market makers with the confidence that the program will continue for an extended period. This assurance will strengthen their motivation to invest the time and effort required to onboard to dYdX Unlimited.”
It’s also important to note that this is a non-binding text proposal. From our understanding and similar to previous seasons, the continuation of the incentives program will be subject to separate dYdX Chain community governance proposals at the end of each respective season.
Thanks!
Can the dydx Foundation clarify what this proposal means:
- Does it mean that Chaos Labs remains the sole provider at this stage, secured with funding of $50k/month from the grants program for 6 months?
- Does point one remain in effect until a proposal is made to cancel it?
- What measures can the community take if it is dissatisfied with the implementation of the proposed ideas?
- Can other potential programs propose their own user-stimulating distributions without a signaling proposal like this one?
- When exactly does Season 7 start? Immediately after the end of Season 6? Because the proposal text specifically states, “Re-launch the dYdX incentive program with $20M over 6 months AFTER the dYdX Unlimited upgrade.”
- Will the dydx Foundation take measures against validators who do not actively participate in the discussion of crucial proposals, which does not align with the standards for validators that you have outlined?
These clarifications are crucial for understanding the implications of the proposal and how governance works in general. Thank you
First of all, I would like to express our gratitude for your response and for valuing this participation. I fully agree with the important role that market makers play in a derivatives market, and I certainly believe it is crucial to have an attractive proposal for them that could encourage them to offer this service. Announcing a new and different phase in this incentive program, in my opinion, could be a more significant catalyst for leading market makers in the sector to reconsider participating in it, rather than a message of mere continuity.
One of our primary motivations in the forum is to actively contribute to the decision-making process in every possible way so that we can see in the metrics the growth that I believe the project deserves. The protocol has the capacity to deploy 20 million over the next six months, which I believe no one questions in terms of budget. Therefore, I think a proposal aimed at this objective, but without the commitment to continuity with previous programs, would likely receive massive support.