Because the priority is to incentivize staking for traders and in general with at least 95% of the trading fee revenue, buybacks experiments have less priority and these experiments shouldn’t be done hurting further the incentives for staking
Until the financial report is provided and the dYdX entities provide their input it is early to put the proposal on-chain
You are right. It is better to do it like that.
Can you please unpack how this mechanism should work?
80% of the buyback of dydx is entirely rewarded to stakers.
You are right. I’m submitting the proposal now.
Final version of 3 months trial fees distribution:
Buybacks - 80%
Staking - 15%
Community Treasury - 5%
Megavault - 0%
Also for the trial period:
All remaining unlocks must be postponed, Surge and similar rewards programmes which are based on DYDX token must be stopped so that circular supply is not increasing.
Submitted. Please vote here:
Very bad decision like a FOMO buying bad trade. It is naive to think that any buyback experiment will ‘pump’ DYDX.
This is not what you mentioned about the trial, you said to keep the same 40% for stakers from the treasury. If you keep telling stakers you are going to remove their little revenue left the token will crash more after most unstake and sell
It’s a 3-month trial, worth giving a shot.
Stakers are held now by anything, except current pocket change from staking rewards.
A hypothetical $100K invested YESTERDAY in the token has turned into $79K Today
A hypothetical $100K invested two weeks ago - $60K.
A month ago - $40K.
A year ago - $20K.
Two years ago - just $6K.
No one will get into such a token. With price action like this, the APR would have to be +100%, 200%, just to spark any interest to the token, but that’s far beyond what we can achieve by redirecting, say, 80–100% of revenue to stakers.
The 80% buyback at current prices would repurchase about 8% of the total token supply per year. The bought tokens go into staking, right? That’s around 60 million tokens in a year, or roughly 240 million (the number of staked coins at the moment) over 4 years
Of course, that’s based at today’s metrics.
If the token price divides to 0.13 tomorrow, just multiply everything by two.
If this math doesn’t save the token, nothing will.
With such a terrible price action like that? Maybe a FOMO, yes. But that’s why it is an experiment to quickly check the theory.
Not following here. if you keep 40% to stakesrs how can you make 80% for buybacks then?
Based on open Binance order book data
Even in case of a $910K (actually with $20 million in revenue, we’ve got about $1.3 million per month for the buyback) market buy could push the token’s price up to around $0.70 - $0.80
Not sure if the buybacks would actually happen this way with market order on binance, but the fact that a single month’s buyback could absorb the entire binance open order book is pretty attractive, especially considering those -20% every other day.
it is not performed as single purchase but as TWAP
I’d like to apologize for the haste. I’ve calmed down from the last crash and am once again checking the calculations for 100% to staking vs. 80% to buybacks, having analyzed the current order book.
I can get my findings tomorrow, but the point is that with 80% buybacks on a TWAP order and a non-empty order book, the projected price will top out at 0.3, which is insignificant. Projected calculations with 95-100% fees to staking with good marketing that promotes the high APR in USDC indicate a much more significant impact on the price and reduce of circulation supply. Now I see way more value in your words.
As fate would have it, I submitted a 80% buyback proposal as “text-type” , which, if passed, will not lead to immediate implementation of changes and will require an additional vote on the technical parameters of smart contracts. Let’s see the results and analyze deeply 95-100% staking option.
Again, my apologise.
true.. appreciate your contributions @staza.. a bit insane though that we rushed this proposal just because the market dumped 
.. anyway, moving forward
In my opinion, even 100% buybacks won’t lead to much if there’s only one buyer in the market.
The DYDX token needs to become an investment asset (staking yield has to be decent), but for now, having just one buyer is simply exit liquidity.
It wasn’t just the DYDX treasury buying tokens off the market. I recommend checking how much the wallet dydx1defy62dgpwg3mchet8e7ym4ekajv3pw540lyfj bought from the market and how many stables were sent to the Binance wallet by 0xb2af9836DB89808964be5dB68964ae7d8dfFC462 in the first half of 2025.
Then, take a look at the token’s price dynamics.
Well you said yourself it is an experiment, then we should use other funds for this experiment, not negatively affecting the security of the dYdX chain and its stakers for doing some experiment that I’m sure will fail and won’t improve the price of the token at all
You forgot about your own proposal? You said to pay stakers still the same 40% share during this three months ‘experiment’ from the community treasury, now you put a proposal on-chain which is different from the actual proposal on the forum that you wrote and while here you say 40% for stakers on the on-chain proposal you say 15%, which is inconsistent and not very professional
That was the initial proposal which was changing through the discussion here in this thread. The latest version which was proposed for voting is also pinned to this thread.
True. But again - the results of voting for submitted proposal will just show the opinion on the 80% buybacks. It won’t be implemented automatically if it pass.
I was thinking on this yesterday-today, analysing current state and the options.
So, this is what I think how protocol can proceed (can be more options, but I compared 3):
Model 1 – Current one
The protocol routes 25% of net revenue to a Buyback Account controlled by the Treasury SubDAO, 25% to the MegaVault and 10% to the Treasury SubDAO. The buybacks are executed periodically via TWAP and purchased DYDX is redelegated. This structure provides minimal real-time price impact and low visible yield.
Model 2 – Buyback-Centric
80% of all protocol revenue is allocated to continuous open-market buybacks of DYDX, with 15% distributed to stakers and 5% retained for the treasury. The purchased tokens are staked. This design creates strong, continuous deflationary pressure and moderate but stable yield for stakers.
Model 3 – Real-Yield Model
95% percent of all protocol revenue is distributed to DYDX stakers in USDC, with the remaining 5% going to the treasury. This model maximizes visible yield (if appropriate marketing means are used to increase the awareness) and creates potentially rapid market repricing, though it is more sensitive to trading volume fluctuations.
I compared these options (with some assumptions) and this is what I got:
You are talking about existing holders OR new ones?
